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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission's decision, 
supported by the medical opinions of three specialists in 
cardiology, was arbitrary, capricious and without any 
substantial support in the record. 
2. Whether Olsen waived the right to appeal on 
the issue of medical causation. 
3. Whether Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev.. 736 P.2d 
37 (Utah 1987), is controlling authority for this case. 
DETERMINITIVE AUTHORITIES 
1. Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev,, 736 P.2d 37 
(Utah 1987). 
2. Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1984). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case; 
Douglas R. Olsen (hereinafter "Olsen") alleges that 
he is permanently and totally disabled pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 35-1-67 (Repl. 1988). 
B. Jurisdiction, Course Of Proceedings And Disposition 
Below; 
On February 26, 1988, the administrative law judge 
(hereinafter "ALJ") denied Olsen7s claim for permanent total 
disability benefits. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order attached as Exhibit "A.") On March 30, 1988, Olsen 
filed a Motion for Review which was denied by a unanimous 
decision of the Industrial Commission on June 1, 1988. 
(Industrial Commission's Order of Denial attached as Exhibit 
"B.") Olsen then filed a Petition for Review which was denied 
by the Utah Court of Appeals. Olsen v. Industrial Comm'n, 
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776 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (attached as as Exhibit 
"C"). Olsen then filed a Writ of Certiorari which was 
granted on October 26, 1989. Olsen v. Industrial Comm'n. 
783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). 
C. Statement of Facts: 
1. Olsen was employed by Tyger Construction 
as a night foreman of a maintenance crew on the Stillwater 
Dam project. (R. at 4-5.) On October 29, 1984, he was required 
to move a portable welding machine that had become frozen to 
the ground. (R. at 55-56.) Shortly thereafter Olsen began 
experiencing chest pains and was subsequently diagnosed as 
having suffered a myocardial infarction involving the anterior 
wall of the heart. (R. at 56-57, 59.) Olsen spent four or 
five days in a hospital at which time he underwent angioplasty 
treatment. (R. at 61-62.) 
2. Wausau Insurance Companies (hereinafter 
"Wausau") paid all medical expenses associated with Olsen's 
1984 heart attack. Wausau also paid temporary total 
disability benefits for the period October 30, 1984, through 
December 2, 1984. (R. at 8.) 
3. On December 3, 1984, Olsen was released by 
his doctor to return to work with "no limitation 
whatsoever." (R. at 62, emphasis supplied.) Olsen returned 
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to work and was later laid off due to a reduction in work 
force. (R. at 62.) 
4. After a one-month layoff, Olsen was called 
back to work as a crane operator. (R. at 63-64.) Olsen 
worked at this job until June 1985, when he was placed in 
charge of the ready-mix concrete operation. (R. at 65.) In 
this capacity Olsen set up and oversaw three ready-mix 
concrete plants. (R. at 65-67.) 
5. On November 22, 1985, Olsen was again laid 
off. (R. at 73.) Olsen took this opportunity to take a 
vacation in southern Colorado. He towed his 40-foot vacation 
trailer to a friend's farm in Ignatio, Colorado, and 
commenced what he described was a relaxing vacation. (R. at 
73-74.) 
6. While on vacation, over ten days after 
having been laid off, Olsen suffered a second myocardial 
infarction on December 2, 1985. (R. at 74-75.) In contrast to 
his 1984 heart attack, the second heart attack was officially 
diagnosed as a myocardial infarction involving the inferior 
left ventricular wall. The first heart attack involved the 
anterior wall. (R. at 249, 250, 279.) 
7. After requesting benefits for the second 
heart attack, Wausau sent Olsen to Dr. J. Joseph Perry, 
F.A.C.C., a respected specialist in cardiology. In his report 
dated March 10, 1986, Dr. Perry indicated that Olsen's inferior 
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wall myocardial infarction was caused by acute occlusion of a 
vessel not involved with the first myocardial infarction. (R. 
at 250.) From this diagnosis, Dr. Perry concluded that the 
two heart attacks were not medically related. 
From this, I would definitely state 
that there was no direct relationship 
between his first myocardial infarction and 
the second myocardial infarction fourteen 
months later in December of 1985. 
Id. (Dr. Perry's report is attached as Exhibit "D.") Based 
on Dr. Perry's conclusion, Wausau denied liability for the 
heart attack that occurred while Olsen was on vacation. 
8. On May 16, 1986, Olsen applied for a 
hearing before the Utah Industrial Commission. (R. at 14-15.) 
Olsen alleged that the demands and stress of his employment 
in 1985 were precipitating factors that led to his second heart 
attack. (R. at 14.) He also alleged that the 1985 heart 
attack was related to the 1984 heart attack. (Id.) 
9. Following the evidentiary hearing on 
September 16, 1986, the ALJ prepared a Summary of Testimony 
which was distributed to all parties. (R. at 260-263.) (The 
ALJ's Suitimary of Testimony is attached as Exhibit "E.,f) It is 
significant that the Summary of Testimony was admitted into 
evidence without objection. Thereafter, the ALJ referred 
Olsen to a medical panel, the chairperson of which was 
another specialist in cardiology, Dr. Michael J. Preece. (R. 
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at 3 02, 3 39.) The Summary of Testimony was given to the 
medical panel for its consideration, again without objection. 
(R. at 263.) 
10. After reviewing the Summary of Testimony and 
all of the medical records, Dr. Preece specifically noted 
numerous positive risk factors that likely caused Olsen's heart 
attacks. (R. at 280.) The positive risk factors identified by 
Dr. Preece include: (1) a family history of heart attacks 
(Olsen's father had three heart attacks in his 40's and died 
from a heart attack at age 56); (2) a family history of 
diabetes (his father had and two brothers have diabetes); (3) a 
family history of high blood pressure (both Olsen and his 
mother have high blood pressure); (4) a personal history of 
smoking approximately one pack of cigarettes per day since age 
16; (5) high blood cholesterol levels; and (6) elevated LDL and 
triglyceride levels. (R. at 85-90, 186, 249, 262-263, 279-280.) 
11. The medical panel found that Olsen's 1984 
heart attack was due to "progressive atherosclerotic blockage 
of the coronary artery." (R. at 281.) The medical panel 
concluded that Olsen's 1984 heart attack "was simply due to 
the combination of predisposing factors which he had at the 
time [and] would not attribute any causative role to any 
physical work which [Olsen] was doing at the time." Id. 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
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12. The medical panel also found no causal 
connection between Olsen's 1985 heart attack and the 1984 heart 
attack. Id. Rather, the medical panel found that the 1985 
heart attack was caused by Olsen's premature preexisting 
arteriolosclerosis. Id. (A copy of the medical panel report 
is attached as Exhibit flF.M) 
13. Before the medical panel report was admitted 
into evidence, Olsen's counsel filed an Objection to the 
Medical Panel Report to highlight the contrary medical opinion 
given by Olsen's personal physician, a general practitioner 
from Colorado. (R. at 289.) At that time, Olsen's counsel 
waived a hearing on the Objection and acknowledged, in writing, 
that the ALJ is the final finder of fact: 
I feel that no useful purpose would be 
served by a hearing on these Objections to 
the Medical Panel Report would serve any 
useful purpose [sic]. I am certain that 
Dr. Preece would simply restate his 
position and Dr. Davidson, hers. I feel 
that the administrative law judge is fully 
capable of separating out the various 
medical and legal problems involved and a 
fair decision made [sic]. 
(R. at 293, emphasis supplied.) 
14. In his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order, the ALJ specifically noted that the medical evidence 
presented by Olsen conflicted with Dr. Preece's medical 
panel report and the evidence presented by Dr. Perry. (R. at 
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302-303.) The ALJ also noted that the 1984 heart attack 
involved an acute anterior wall myocardial infarction, 
whereas the 1985 heart attack involved the inferior wall. 
(R. at 306.) The ALJ concluded that Olsen had not sustained 
his burden of proving that his disabilities were the result of 
or caused by the work activities performed at Tyger 
Construction: 
Based on the findings of the medical panel 
and the preponderance of medical 
evidence, and considering the applicant's 
risk factors for heart disease, I 
conclude that he has not satisfied the 
medical causation requirement of the 
Allen accident test. Accordingly, the 
applicant's claim must be denied. 
(R. at 306, emphasis supplied.) 
15. Olsen subsequently filed a Motion for 
Review. (R. at 310.) Contrary to the position he now asserts, 
it is significant that Olsen conceded the issue of medical 
causation in his Motion for Review: 
With reference to the relationship between 
the event of November 1985 being related to 
the myocardial infarction of October 1984, 
Applicant concedes that there is no 
medical connection. 
(R. at 320, emphasis supplied.) (A copy of Olsen's Motion for 
Review is attached as Exhibit "G.") 
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16• In its Order Denying Olsen's Motion for 
Review, the Industrial Commission found the only issue was 
whether the ALJ had correctly determined that there was no 
medical causation under the Allen accident test. (R. at 
339.) 
17. Olsen then filed a Petition for Review with 
the Utah Court of Appeals which unanimously affirmed the 
decision of the Industrial Commission, holding that "there was 
competent, comprehensive medical evidence in the record upon 
which the Commission could rely in concluding that petitioner's 
heart attacks were not medically related to his employment 
activities . . . ." Olsen, 776 P.2d at 940. 
18. On October 26, 1989, Olsen7s Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari was granted by this court. Olsen, 783 
P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. To Prevail on This Appeal, Olsen Must Demonstrate 
That There is No Substantial Medical Evidence in Support 
of the Industrial Commissions Decision Regarding Medical 
Causation. 
To be entitled to workers7 compensation benefits 
Olsen must prove: (1) the existence of an accident; 
(2) legal causation; and (3) medical causation. Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). The present 
case involves only medical causation — i.e., the requisite 
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connection between Olsen's work activities and his myocardial 
infarctions. 
Medical causation was the primary issue addressed by 
the ALJ: 
I conclude that [Olsen] has not satisfied 
the medical causation requirement of the 
Allen accident test. Accordingly, the 
applicant's claim must be denied. 
(R. at 302-303, 306.) This was also the only issue decided by 
the Industrial Commission: 
The Commission finds that the only issue on 
review is whether the Administrative Law 
Judge correctly determined that there is 
insufficient evidence to support a finding 
of medical causation. 
(R. at 339.) Similarly, the Utah Court of Appeals addressed 
this issue in its review of the Industrial Commission's 
decision: 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly 
stated that where the medical evidence is 
conflicting, "it is the responsibility of 
the administrative law judge to resolve 
factual conflicts." Lancaster v. 
Gilbert Dev.. 736 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah 
1987) . Moreover, we do not deem the 
Commission's findings arbitrary and 
capricious "simply because the Commission 
adopted the findings of the [medical] panel 
rather than those of the independent 
physicians. . . . " Rekward v. 
Industrial Comm'n 755 P.2d 166, 168 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). Accordingly, we find 
there was competent, comprehensive medical 
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evidence in the record upon which the 
Commission could rely in concluding that 
[Olsen's] heart attacks were not medically 
related to his employment activities . . . . 
Olsen v. Industrial Comm'n. 776 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
In light of the finding below that Olsen failed to 
establish medical causation, it is significant that Olsen's 
Brief does not directly address this issue. Instead, Olsen 
attacks the credibility of the medical panel chairperson and 
claims that the Industrial Commission (not the ALJ) improperly 
granted deference and abdicated its responsibilities to the 
medical panel. Even if respondents were to concede the 
complete validity of Olsen7s arguments (which respondents do 
not), Olsen still carries the burden of establishing that his 
employment activities were medically related to his heart 
attacks. Because this court must apply a very deferential 
standard of review to the medical facts, as found below, the 
finding that Olsen failed to establish medical causation must 
be affirmed. 
B. Lancaster v. Gilbert Development is Dispositive of this 
Appeal. 
The administrative law judge has the exclusive 
responsibility of weighing conflicting medical evidence and 
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determining whether an applicant has sustained his or her 
burden of proving medical causation. Lancaster v. Gilbert 
Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah 1987) (attached as Exhibit 
"H.") In Lancaster, the ALJ denied benefits to an employee 
under medical and procedural circumstances nearly identical to 
those in the case at bar. As in the instant case, the issue in 
Lancaster was whether the employee's work activities caused 
his heart attack. In affirming the ALJ's decision, this court 
held: 
Although the medical evidence was 
conflicting, it is the responsibility of 
the administrative law judge to resolve 
factual conflicts. 
We hold that the Industrial 
Commission's conclusion that there was no 
medical causal connection . . . is neither 
"arbitrary or capricious" nor "without any 
substantial evidence to support it." We 
therefore affirm the Order of the 
Industrial Commission. 
Id. at 241. 
In the case at bar, the ALJ properly weighed all of 
the medical evidence and determined that Olsen had not met 
his burden of proving medical causation. Accordingly, the 
holding of Lancaster, in conjunction with the 
well-established standard of review for factual findings, 
mandates affirmance of the finding of no medical causation. 
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C. Olsen has Waived the Right to Appeal on the Lack of 
Medical Causation Between the 1984 and 1985 Heart 
Attacks. 
Olsen initially argued two theories: (1) that the 
1985 heart attack was medically related to the 1984 heart 
attack and (2) that the 1985 heart attack is medically related 
to his recent work activities. After the ALJ denied liability 
on both theories, Olsen filed a Motion for Review in which he 
advanced only the second theory. In fact, Olsen7s Motion for 
Review expressly waived the first theory: 
With reference to the relationship between 
the [heart attack] of November 1985 being 
related to the myocardial infarction of 
October 1984, applicant concedes that there 
is no medical connection. 
(R. at 320.) Based on Olsen,s concession that "there is no 
medical connection" between his 1984 and 1985 heart attacks, he 
is now estopped from asserting a contrary position. Pease 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984). 
Accordingly, the issue of medical causation with respect to the 
1985 heart attack, as it relates to the 1984 heart attack, is 
not properly before this court. 
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D. The Administrative Law Judge Did Not Grant Deference 
or Abdicate His Responsibilities to the Medical Panel. 
Olsen's lead argument is that "the Commission erred 
in giving deference to the Medical [Panel] Report." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 9, 10-2 0.) This entire argument relies 
upon unfortunate and admittedly inappropriate dicta contained 
in the Industrial Commission's denial of Olsen's Motion for 
Review. (R. at 3 39.) 
A thorough review of the medical records, the ALJ's 
Findings of Fact and the Industrial Commission's Order reveals 
without any doubt that the finder of fact — the administrative 
law judge — did not give deference to the medical panel 
report. Rather, the ALJ painstakingly reviewed all of the 
medical evidence and concluded that the element of medical 
causation was not established. Therefore, the finder of fact 
did not improperly defer to the medical panel report. 
Olsen's argument also takes the Industrial 
Commission's Order entirely out of context. When placed in 
proper context, it is apparent that the Industrial Commission 
reviewed all of the medical evidence. Moreover, by finding 
that the Industrial Commission took into account all of the 
medical evidence, the Utah Court of Appeals specifically 
rejected Olsen's present contention that deference was given to 
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the medical panel report. Olsen, 776 P.2d at 940, n. 2 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
A R G U M E N T S 
POINT I 
THIS COURT HAS A STRICTLY LIMITED STANDARD OP REVIEW 
AND MUST SURVEY THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE FINDINGS AND ORDER OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
The scope of appellate review regarding factual 
findings before the Industrial Commission has been described 
and interpreted numerous times by this court. In 
Kavalinakis v. Industrial Commission. 67 Utah 174, 246 P. 
598 (1926) , this court described the applicable standards of 
review as follows: 
[When] we are asked to overturn the 
findings and conclusions of the Commission 
which appear to be in conflict with or 
contrary to the evidence, it must be 
clearly made to appear to us that the 
Commission acted arbitrarily or 
capriciously and wholly without cause in 
rejecting or refusing to give effect to the 
evidence. . . . Any other conclusions 
would make this court merely a reviewing 
court with power to waive a probative 
effect of the evidence . . . . Unless 
therefore, it can be said, upon the whole 
record, that the Commission clearly acted 
1 Because this case was commenced prior to January 1, 1988, the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
does not apply See Utah Code Ann Sec 63-46b-22(l) (Repl 1988) 
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arbitrarily or capriciously in making its 
finding and decision, this court is 
powerless to interfere. Such is the 
manifest purpose and intent of the 
Workmen's Compensation Act. . . . It was 
not intended, . . . that this court, in 
matters of evidence, should to any extent 
substitute its judgment for the judgment of 
the Commission. 
67 Utah at 181-82, 246 P. at 700, 701. 
In Kaiser Steel Corporation v. Monfredi, 631 
P.2d 888, 889-890 (Utah 1981), Justice Oaks extensively 
reviewed the standard of review for findings of fact and 
concluded as follows: 
The Kavalinakis declaration that the 
Commission will be sustained in its 
findings of fact unless its action was 
"arbitrary or capricious" has been cited 
repeatedly as the appropriate standard by 
which this court reviews the Commission's 
findings of fact. [Footnote omitted.] 
• • * 
Under any of these standards — 
Kavalinakis, Kent, or Norris — it is 
apparent that this court's function in 
reviewing Commission findings of fact is a 
strictly limited one in which the question 
is not whether the court agrees with the 
Commission's findings or whether they are 
supported by the preponderance of the 
evidence. Instead, the reviewing court's 
inquiry is whether the Commission's 
findings are "arbitrary or capricious," or 
"wholly without cause" or contrary to the 
"one [inevitable] conclusion from the 
evidence" or without "any substantial 
evidence" to support them. Only then 
should the Commission's findings be 
displaced. 
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It is also elementary law in Utah that the reviewing 
tribunal shall not weigh the probative effect of conflicting 
evidence before the Commission. Wiseman v. Village 
Partners, 589 P.2d 754, 755 (Utah 1978); dinger v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 571 P.2d 1328, 1329 (Utah 1977). In other 
words, the reviewing court should not "to any extent substitute 
its judgment [upon factual matters] for the judgment of the 
Commission." Kavalinakis. 67 Utah at 184, 246 P. at 701. 
The appellate body must also survey the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the Commission's findings. 
Chadwick v. Industrial Comm'n, 572 P.2d 400, 402 (Utah 
1977) . As a corollary to this rule, the reviewing court must 
presume that the Commission believed the evidence supporting 
its findings. IGA Food Fair v. Martin, 584 P.2d 828, 829 
(Utah 1978). 
In light of the foregoing, the issue on this appeal 
becomes whether there is any substantial evidence to support 
the ALJ's finding of no medical causation or, alternatively, 
whether the ALJ acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 
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POINT II 
OLSEN'S 1985 HEART ATTACK DID NOT ARISE 
OUT OF AND IN THE COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. 
It is undisputed that the burden of proof is on Olsen 
to establish that his heart attack occurred as the result of 
his employment, and this proof must be shown by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (Repl. 1988). 
In Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency. Inc., 606 P.2d 256 
(Utah 1980), this court was faced with deciding whether an 
employee's accident arose out of and in the course of 
employment-related duties. This court upheld the Industrial 
Commission's denial of benefits: 
To maintain actuarial soundness and 
integrity of workmen's compensation 
systems, it is essential that premiums be 
collected to cover the risks involved. The 
coverage does not, and as a practical 
matter, cannot extend to injury done to an 
employee wherever and whenever it happens, 
but is limited to accidental injuries which 
occur in the course of or arise out of the 
performance of his duties. [Footnote 
omitted.] 
* • * 
[I]f the predominant motivation and purpose 
of the activity is in serving the social 
aspect, or other personal diversion of the 
employee . . . the person should not be 
deemed to be in the course of his 
employment; and where there is uncertainty 
as to the just-stated propositions, that 
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[uncertainty] should be resolved by the 
Commission as the trier of the facts. 
(Id. at 257-258.) 
A similar issue was decided in Carnesecca v. 
Wasatch Bank of Pleasant Grove, 688 P.2d 476 (Utah 1984). In 
Carnesecca, the administrative law judge denied benefits 
because the decedent was killed in a plane crash after he had 
been invited to go elk hunting with his brother-in-law. In 
upholding the Industrial Commission's denial of benefits, this 
court indicated that injuries occurring while the employee is 
not in the course of his employment are noncompensable: 
From the facts found by the lower tribunal 
in the instant case, which we must respect 
on review if not tortured by indiscretion 
of the tribunal, the elk hunt was not 
within the course of decedent's employment. 
Id. at 477. 
Finally, in Black v. McDonald's of Layton, 733 
P.2d 154 (Utah 1987), the sole issue being decided was whether 
the employee was in the course of his employment when he was 
injured while traveling to a recreational activity with fellow 
employees. Id. at 156. This court again upheld the 
Industrial Commission's denial of benefits: 
To be embraced within the ambient of 
"course of employment," the injury must be 
received while the employee is carrying on 
the work which he is called upon to perform 
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or doing some act incidental thereto. It 
must occur within the period of employment, 
at a place or area where the employee may 
reasonably be, and while the employee is 
engaged in an activity at least incidental 
to his employment. 
Id. at 156 (citations omitted). 
The foregoing examples illustrate that Olsen's 1985 
heart attack did not arise out of and occur in the course of 
his employment at Tyger Construction. Rather, by his own 
admission, Olsen was on a "relaxing vacation in Colorado." 
(R. at 73-74.) Moreover, Olsen had not worked for over ten 
days. (Id.) Accordingly, Olsen's claim that his 1985 heart 
attack was the result of his employment activities remains 
2 
unsupported. (Appellant's Brief, p. 15.) Therefore, the 
Industrial Commission's conclusion that Olsen's 1985 heart 
attack did not arise out of and occur in the course of his 
employment is amply supported by the record and by Olsen's 
clear admissions. Given these uncontroverted facts, the 
Industrial Commission's conclusion was neither arbitrary nor 
capricious, and, under the applicable standard of review, must 
be affirmed. 
2. Olsen's Brief states that "[t]he lapse of time between the conclusion of work in November [1985] and 
the [1985 heart attack] is not unprecedented." (Appellant's Brief, p. 15.) It is noteworthy that 
Olsen makes this statement but does not attack or dispute the administrative law judge's finding that 
the 1985 heart attack occurred while Olsen was on vacation in Colorado. (R. at 73-74.) 
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POINT III 
OLSEN HAS WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO APPEAL ON 
THE ISSUE OF MEDICAL CAUSATION. 
In contradiction to the position he took in his 
Motion for Review before the Industrial Commission, Olsen 
now argues that his 1985 heart attack should be compensable 
because it was medically related to his 1984 heart attack. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 14.) In other words, Olsen argues 
that his 1985 heart attack was the medical result of either the 
1984 heart attack or the work exertion experienced by Olsen 
prior to his 1984 heart attack. 
In his Motion for Review, Olsen7s prior counsel 
conceded the issue of medical causation with respect to the 
connection between Olsen7s 1984 and 1985 heart attacks: 
With reference to the relationship between 
the event of November 1985 being related to 
the myocardial infarction of October 1984, 
Applicant concedes that there is no medical 
connection. 
(R. at 320.) 
Because Olsen conceded the issue of medical 
causation between the 1984 and 1985 heart attacks, neither 
respondents nor the Industrial Commission analyzed this legal 
theory. As such, Olsen has waived his right to raise this 
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theory on appeal. Pease v. Industrial Comm'n, 694 P.2d 
613, 616 (Utah 1984). 
In Pease, an employer was found personally liable 
for workers' compensation benefits. Id. at 614. A motion 
for review of sorts was filed, but no specific errors were 
specified or alleged. Id. at 615. On appeal to this court, 
the employer argued that the Industrial Commission failed to 
provide proper notice of hearing. Id. The employer also 
argued that the Industrial Commission's findings of fact were 
insufficient as a matter of law. Id. 
In a unanimous decision, this court held that the 
employer's failure to raise these issues in his motion for 
review was fatal: 
In filing the "Motion for Review" under 
§ 35-1-82.53, Mr. Pease had the 
obligation to raise all the issues that 
could have been presented at that time, and 
those issues not raised were waived. . . . 
Mr. Pease also argues that the finding 
. . . is inadequate . . . However, he also 
failed to raise that issue on the Motion 
for Review and therefore waived it. 
Pease, 694 P.2d at 616 (citations omitted). See also 
Alvin G. -Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Comm'n, 681 
P.2d 1244, 1249 (Utah 1984); USX Corp. v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 83, 88 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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Based on Olsen's concession that there was no medical 
connection between the 1984 and 1985 heart attacks, he is now 
estopped from asserting a contrary position. Similarly, 
because he failed to raise this issue in his Motion for Review, 
Olsen has waived his right to raise this issue on appeal. 
Respondents respectfully submit that Pease v. Industrial 
Commission, 694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984), is dispositive of this 
appeal with respect to the medical connection between Olsen's 
1984 and 1985 heart attacks. However, to demonstrate that 
Olsen's substantive arguments are without merit, the remainder 
of respondents7 brief will address Olsen's claims on their 
merits. 
POINT IV 
THE RECORD OVERWHELMINGLY SUPPORTS THE COMMISSION'S 
CONCLUSION THAT OLSEN FAILED TO SUSTAIN HIS BURDEN OF PROOF 
WITH RESPECT TO MEDICAL CAUSATION. 
A. Olsen Has Not Sustained His Burden of Showing a Medical 
Connection Between His Work Activities and His Heart 
Attacks. 
To demonstrate medical causation an applicant must 
introduce evidence establishing that the "stress, strain, or 
exertion required by his or her occupation led to the resulting 
injury or disability." Allen, 729 P.2d at 27. As illustrated 
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below, Olsen has failed to show the requisite medical connection 
between his disability and the exertion required by his job. 
In his treatise on workers' compensation, 
Professor Larson indicates that the failure of a heart attack 
claim on medical causation grounds can occur in several ways: 
There may be direct physical evidence 
. . . . There may be medical opinion 
evidence denying the causal connection, 
with or without conflicting medical 
testimony, and in such cases, under 
familiar rules, an appellate court will not 
disturb a denial of compensation. Or the 
medical testimony on which the claim rests 
may be too speculative or weak to meet the 
burden of proof. . . . Probably the 
commonest reason for defeated claims is 
simply the general inadequacy of proof 
connecting the injury medically with the 
employment. 
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 38.84 (1989) (Desk Ed.) 
(footnotes omitted). 
At least four doctors gave opinions on the issue of 
medical causation. Dr. Perry's conclusion with respect to 
medical causation is succinct and straightforward: 
Clearly the inferior wall myocardial 
infarction was caused by acute occlusion of 
a vessel not involved with his first 
myocardial infarction directly. 
From this I would definitely state 
that there was no direct relationship 
between his first myocardial infarction and 
the second myocardial infarction 14 months 
later in December of 1985. 
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(R. at 250.) 
Dr. Preece, the medical panel chairperson, also 
concluded that there is no causal link between Olsen's 1985 
heart attack and the employment exertion experienced by Olsen: 
[T]he myocardial infarction of December 2, 
1985, was not produced by the myocardial 
infarction of October 29, 1984. However, 
both myocardial infarctions have a common 
causative element, that is the premature 
arteriosclerosis which this patient is 
unfortunate enough to have. 
(R. at 281.) Dr. Preece also stated that the 1984 heart 
attack did not incapacitate Olsen, whereas the 1985 heart 
attack did: 
Obviously, [the 1984 infarction] produced a 
permanent scar or amount of damaged muscle 
to his heart. That amount of muscle by 
itself was not enough to incapacitate him. 
It was only when the second myocardial 
infarction occurred in December of 1985, 
that he had sufficient muscle damage so 
that he is now permanently and 
significantly incapacitated. 
(R. at 282.) 
In spite of what Olsen states in his brief, Dr. 
Heuser, the applicant's treating cardiologist from New 
Mexico, buttresses respondents' contention that preexisting and 
premature arteriosclerosis caused Olsen's heart attacks: 
Mr. Doug Olsen is a patient of mine 
whom I first saw on 12-5-85. The patient 
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had an anterior infarction November 1984 
treated in Utah. When he presented a year 
later with an inferior infarction, 
clearly this was due to arteriosclerotic 
coronary disease that was present even 
before he was first seen in Salt Lake Citv 
[in 1984]. There is no question in my 
mind that this arteriosclerotic process was 
present at the time of his original 
anterior infarction, although his right 
coronary artery disease was not as severe 
as it was the time of his second 
infarction. 
(R. at 249, emphasis supplied.) In other words, Dr. Heuser 
believed that the arteriosclerotic disease, which was present 
prior to and after both heart attacks, "clearly" caused Olsen's 
3 
heart attacks. 
In contrast, the only doctor supporting the view 
that Olsen's 1985 heart attack was medically related to the 
employment exertion he experienced in 1984 comes from 
Dr. Davidson, a family practitioner. From a review of Olsen's 
Brief, one could get the impression that Dr. Davidson 
"unequivocally" supported a finding of medical causation. 
(Appellants Brief, pp. 12, 14.) However, when Dr. Davidson's 
entire opinion is placed in context, it is apparent that she, 
too, questions the causal relationship: 
3 Respondents acknowledge Dr Heuser's March 12, 1986 correspondence to Wausau. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 12.) A careful review of that correspondence, however, shows that Dr. Heuser's 
mappropnate legal conclusion does not change the fact that Olsen's 1984 heart attack involved the 
anterior wall whereas the 1985 heart attack involved the inferior wall and that Dr. Heuser personally 
concluded that premature arteriosclerosis caused Olsen's heart attacks. 
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I cannot ascribe a direct causal 
relationship, but the second event was 
directly related, in fact a recurrence, of 
the myocardial infarction that took place 
October 29, 1984 [sic]* 
(R. at 287, emphasis supplied.) Note that Dr. Davidson 
contradicts herself by stating she cannot ascribe a "direct 
causal relationship" between the 1984 and 1985 heart attacks. 
After reviewing the foregoing medical opinions, three 
of which were rendered by cardiologists, the ALJ determined 
that Olsen had not sustained his burden of proving that his 
heart attacks were medically caused by his work activities. 
The ALJ succinctly summarized the overwhelming medical evidence 
as follows: 
[T]he medical panel cardiologist 
fDr. Preece] found that the applicant's 
heart attack of October 29, 1984, was due 
to a blockage of his coronary artery due to 
a preexisting heart disease, and not due 
to any physical work he was performing on 
that date. Dr. Heuser, Mr. Olsen's 
treating cardiologist in New Mexico, also 
indicates that the applicant's heart 
attacks of October 29, 1984, and December 
2, 1985, were due to arteriosclerotic 
coronary disease. . . . 
The Administrative Law Judge must 
respectfully disagree with Dr. Davidson 
[the applicant's family physician] in this 
regard, since her foregoing finding is 
contrary to the overwhelming medical 
evidence contained on [sic] the file. For 
example, Dr. Perry. a [third] 
cardiologist, found that: 
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Clearly the inferior wall myocardial 
infarction was caused by acute 
occlusion of a vessel not involved 
with his first myocardial infarction 
directly. 
From this I would definitely stated 
[sic] there was no direct relationship 
between his first myocardial 
infarction and the second myocardial 
infarction fourteen [sic] months later 
in December of 1985. 
* * * 
Based on the findings of the medical panel 
and the preponderance of medical 
evidence, and considering the applicant's 
positive risk factors for heart disease, I 
conclude that he has not satisfied the 
medical causation requirement of the 
Allen accident test. Accordingly, the 
applicant's claim must be denied. 
(R. at 302-303, 306, emphasis supplied.) 
Given the deferential standard of review outlined 
above, the threshold issue governing this entire appeal is 
uncomplicated and straightforward: Is there any substantial 
evidence to support the ALJ's finding of no medical causation, 
or was that finding entered arbitrarily and capriciously? 
Because the finding of no medical causation was unquestionably 
supported by ample medical evidence, his conclusion was not 
arbitrary or capricious. 
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B. The Finder of Fact Did Not Improperly Grant Deference 
to the Medical Panel Report. 
In Point I of his Brief, Olsen argues that the 
Industrial Commission erred by allegedly giving deference to 
the medical panel report. (Appellant's Brief, p. 9.) It is 
significant that this entire argument centers on dicta 
contained in the Industrial Commission's Order denying Olsen's 
Motion for Review. (R. at 339.) In its Order, the Industrial 
Commission stated that it "has in the past maintained a fairly 
consistent practice of deferring to the medical panel absent 
good reason shown why the medical panel report is insufficient 
or biased." Id. That isolated quotation, however, takes the 
Industrial Commission's Order entirely out of context. A 
review of the Industrial Commission's complete Order shows 
that the medical opinions of Dr. Preece, Dr. Perry, 
Dr. Heuser and Dr. Davidson were each considered. 
Thereafter, the Industrial Commission affirmed the finding of 
the ALJ as follows: 
With the above-listed medical evidence 
submitted, the Administrative Law Judge 
determined that the medical panel report 
should be adopted [because] the 
preponderance of the medical evidence was 
supportive of the medical panel doctor. 
• * * 
The Commission finds that the only 
issue on review is whether the 
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Administrative Law Judge correctly 
determined that there was insufficient 
evidence to support a finding of medical 
causation. This case is unusual in the 
diversity of medical opinion presented. 
Several of the doctors who have rendered 
opinions regarding the causation issue have 
stated conclusions that are exactly 
opposite of another doctor. . . . Although 
Dr. Heuser and Dr. Davidson make 
contrary conclusions, the reasons for those 
conclusions are not stated. In contrast, 
the medical panel doctor's conclusions are 
explained with a listing given of the 
numerous pre-existing conditions suffered 
by the applicant predisposing him to 
cardiac arrest. There appears to be no 
good reason to reject the medical panel 
report, there being no insufficiency in the 
explanation and no bias. Therefore, the 
Commission must deny the applicant's Motion 
for Review and affirm the Administrative 
Law Judge. 
(R. at 338-339.) Based on the Industrial Commission's 
thoughtful review of all the medical evidence, it is clear that 
the Industrial Commission was unbiased in its decision. 
Olsen's first argument also overlooks the proper role 
of the ALJ as the finder of fact. As noted above, the ALJ 
adopted what he believed was the "preponderance of the medical 
evidence" in finding that Olsen had not sustained his burden 
of proving medical causation. (R. at 303.) In affirming this 
conclusion, the Industrial Commission adopted a summarized 
version of the medical evidence as found by the ALJ. (R. at 
339.) On this appeal, however, Olsen contends that it was 
the Industrial Commission that granted deference to the 
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medical panel report. This argument fails because it was the 
ALJ as the finder of fact, and not the Industrial Commission as 
the reviewing tribunal, who found that Olsen had not 
sustained his burden of proving medical causation. In other 
words, the Industrial Commission simply adopted the ALJ's 
findings with respect to medical causation. Because Olsen's 
entire argument is directed at the Industrial Commission's 
alleged failure to treat equally all medical evidence, Olsen's 
first argument fails on its face. 
C. Lancaster v. Gilbert Development Mandates Affirmance 
of the Administrative Law Judge's Factual Finding 
Regarding Medical Causation. 
It is not unusual to have differences of opinion in 
heart attack cases. The case at bar bears this out. 
Nevertheless, on appeal, Olsen bears the heavy burden of 
demonstrating that the Industrial Commission's decision was 
arbitrary, capricious or without support in the record. That 
fact was made extremely clear in the recent case of 
Lancaster v. Gilbert Development. 736 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1987) . 
In Lancaster, this court upheld a decision of the 
Industrial Commission denying benefits to an applicant under 
medical circumstances nearly identical to those in the case at 
bar. Like the instant case, Mr. Lancaster was suffering 
from numerous risk factors making him a likely candidate for a 
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heart attack — on or off the job. Id. at 238. Unlike the 
instant case, Mr. Lancaster eventually suffered a myocardial 
infarction while at work. Id. The issue presented for 
decision was whether Mr. Lancaster's work activities had 
precipitated his myocardial infarction, i.e., medical 
causation. Id. at 239-240. 
In support of his contention that his employment 
activities had precipitated his heart attack, Mr. Lancaster 
proffered the testimony of his cardiologist, Dr. Chanderraj, 
and that of the medical panel chairman, Dr. Perry, the same 
Dr. Perry as in the present case. Id. When asked whether 
the altitude, cold and working conditions precipitated 
Mr. Lancaster's heart attack, Dr. Chanderraj responded in 
the affirmative: 
If he had not been working up on that 
particular day in the cold atmosphere, 
operating the heavy equipment, in spite of 
having . . . five days history of chest 
pain, he probably would not have sustained 
a myocardial infarction. 
Id. at 240. In other words, Mr. Lancaster's physician 
indicated that but for the working conditions and exertion 
required by his employment, Mr. Lancaster would not have 
suffered his myocardial infarction. Opinions regarding medical 
causation do not get much stronger than this. Mr. Lancaster 
also proffered the testimony of Dr. Perry who concluded that 
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it was "likely" that the conditions under which Mr. Lancaster 
was working aggravated his preexisting heart condition. Id. 
In rebuttal, the insurance carrier proffered the 
testimony of its independent medical examiner, Dr. Dituri. 
Id. Dr. Dituri was not a cardiologist, and had not 
personally examined Mr. Lancaster. Id. Dr. Dituri 
indicated that Mr. Lancaster's myocardial infarction was not 
due to work exertion, but rather: 
due to the normal progression of 
arteriosclerotic coronary artery disease 
that had been present for several years and 
was due to such factors as his smoking, his 
hypercholesterolemia, his poorly controlled 
diabetes and his prior history of alcohol 
abuse. 
Id. 
Notwithstanding the contrary medical opinions of 
Dr. Chanderraj and Dr. Perry, the ALJ chose to adopt the 
lone opinion of the insurance carrier's independent medical 
examiner, Dr. Dituri. Id. at 241. Although there was 
substantial conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ found that 
Mr. Lancaster had not sustained his burden of proving medical 
causation. Id. 
On appeal, this court took the opportunity to clarify 
the analytical framework developed in Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Lancaster, 736 P.2d 
at 239. As in the instant case, the issue being reviewed was 
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whether the Industrial Commission's actions were arbitrary or 
capricious• Id. at 241. In affirming the Industrial 
Commission's decision, this court held that it was the 
exclusive responsibility of the administrative law judge to 
weigh the conflicting medical evidence and to determine whether 
the applicant had sustained his burden of proof with respect to 
medical causation under the Allen analysis: 
[T]here is competent and comprehensive 
medical evidence in the record upon which 
the administrative law judge could rely in 
concluding that medical causation was 
lacking. Although the medical evidence was 
conflicting, it is the responsibility of 
the administrative law judge to resolve 
factual conflicts. 
We hold that the Industrial 
Commission's conclusion that there was no 
medical causal connection between work 
conditions and the claimant's heart attack 
is neither "arbitrary or capricious" nor 
"without any substantial evidence to 
support it." We therefore affirm the order 
of the Industrial Commission. 
Id. (Emphasis supplied.) 
It is respondents' position that Lancaster v. 
Gilbert Development is dispositive authority given the 
substantial procedural and factual similarities with the case 
4 
at bar. In other words, although the medical evidence 
presented in the instant case is, only arguably, somewhat 
4. It is puwling but noteworthy that Olsen wholly omits to acknowledge or address Lancaster. 
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conflicting, it overwhelming supports the conclusion reached by 
the ALJ: 
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the 
overwhelming preponderance of the medical 
evidence on [sic] this file supports the 
findings of the medical panel, and 
accordingly the objections of the applicant 
to the medical panel report are hereby 
dismissed. 
• * * 
Based on the findings of the medical panel 
and the preponderance of medical 
evidence, and considering the applicant's 
positive risk factors for heart disease, I 
conclude that he has not satisfied the 
medical causation requirement of the 
Allen accident test. Accordingly, the 
applicant's claim must be denied. 
(R. at 303, 306, emphasis supplied.) Therefore, given the 
great weight of medical evidence presented by well-respected 
cardiologists, the ALJ's conclusion that Olsen failed to 
establish medical causation finds ample support in the record. 
As such, the Industrial Commission's decision to affirm the 
finding of the ALJ was neither arbitrary or capricious, nor 
without substantial support. Lancaster, 736 P.2d at 241. 
Given the substantial similarities between the instant case and 
Lancaster/ the Order of the Industrial Commission must be 
affirmed. 
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POINT V 
OLSEN'S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE CONJECTURAL, WITHOUT 
SUPPORT IN THE RECORD, AND NOT GERMANE 
TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL. 
Respondents herein have tried to place Olsen's 
arguments in a workable context• In Point I, respondents 
set forth the applicable standard of review. In Point II, it 
was shown that Olsen's 1985 heart attack did not occur in the 
course and scope of his employment at Tyger Construction. In 
Point III/ it was shown that Olsen has waived his right to 
appeal on the issue of medical causation. Finally, in Point 
IV, respondents showed that the record amply supports the ALJ's 
conclusion that Olsen failed to sustain his burden of showing 
a medical connection between his work activities and his heart 
attacks. From respondents' point of view, these four arguments 
resolve this appeal. It is with this background that 
respondents now briefly address the plethora of allegations 
contained in Olsen's Brief. 
In Point I of his Brief, Olsen argues that the 
Industrial Commission erred by giving deference to the medical 
panel. With absolutely no support or foundation, Olsen 
contends that the medical panel opinion is "not only out of the 
mainstream of contemporary medical opinion, but pushes upstream 
against the current of accepted medical thought. . . . " 
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(Appellant's Brief, pp. 12, 18 & 19.) Olsen also attempts to 
discredit the finding of the medical panel by subjectively 
claiming that the medical panel chairperson failed to 
understand the questions asked by the ALJ. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 6, 12, 13, & 18.) 
In response, neither Olsen nor his counsel are 
qualified to speak as to what constitutes the mainstream of 
medical thought in cases involving myocardial infarctions. In 
addition, it is important that Olsen expressly waived his 
right to a hearing on the Objections to the Medical Panel 
Report. (R. at 293.) Had Olsen requested a hearing, he could 
have presented evidence regarding what he now contends is "the 
current mainstream of medical thought." Id. Presently, 
however, there is no evidence in the record on this subject 
other than the evidence presented by the three cardiologists. 
As such, the opinions of the cardiologists cannot be viewed 
with skepticism simply because the ALJ failed to adopt the lone 
opinion rendered by Olsen's treating physician. 
Olsen's subjective attack of the medical panel 
chairperson is similarly without merit. (Appellant's Brief, 
pp. 6, 12, 13 & 18.) In alleging that the chairperson did not 
comprehend the questions propounded to him, Olsen is attempting 
to read the mind of the medical panel chairperson and to second 
guess what information was considered by Drs. Preece and 
Perry. Not only is such an attack improper, but it is also 
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unfounded. If one reads the entire medical panel report, it is 
apparent that the medical panel was fully apprised of Olsen7s 
medical history as well as the facts and circumstances 
surrounding both heart attacks. The fact that Olsen does not 
agree with the medical panel's conclusions is not reason to 
discredit those conclusions, especially in view of the 
overwhelming corroborative medical evidence presented by 
Drs. Perry and Heuser. Moreover, it is also inappropriate 
to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. Pease, 694 
P.2d at 616. 
In Point II of his Brief, Olsen argues that the 
Commission erred in reopening the issue of liability with 
respect to the 1984 heart attack. As such, Olsen boldly but 
incorrectly concludes that respondents are estopped from 
denying liability and that "this Court has the authority to 
rule on the evidence that Olsen suffered a compensable 
accident on October 29, 1984." (Appellant's Brief, p. 2 0.) 
This argument is blatantly misleading and sidesteps the 
5 
threshold issue on this appeal — medical causation. 
Even if respondents are estopped from denying 
liability, for the 1984 heart attack, Olsen nevertheless must 
establish that his present disability is medically related to 
5. It is undisputed that Wausau paid benefits for about one month following Olsen's 1984 heart attack. 
However, the issue, which Olsen repeatedly fails to address, is whether his current disabilities are 
related to the 1984 heart attack — not whether the 1984 heart attack constitutes a compensable 
industrial accident. 
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the employment exertion experienced in 1984. The ALJ and the 
Industrial Commission rejected this argument. The Utah Court 
of Appeals analyzed Olsen's estoppel argument in depth and 
concluded as follows: 
Thus, the Commission did not "reopen" the 
issue of compensability, but rather 
reviewed petitioner's heart attack for the 
first time. Accordingly, we review the 
Commission's determination with respect to 
the 1984 heart attack under the same 
standard of review previously set forth in 
this opinion, and our conclusion remains 
the same — there is substantial, competent 
medical testimony supporting the 
Commission's conclusion that petitioner's 
1984 heart attack was not medically related 
to his employment activities. 
Olsen, 776 P.2d at 941. Based on the fact that Olsen has 
not met his burden of establishing medical causation, his 
estoppel argument is irrelevant. Therefore, respondents are 
not estopped from denying liability for a heart attack 
medically unrelated to Olsen's work activities. 
In Point III of his Brief, Olsen argues that the 
Industrial Commission abdicated its fact-finding 
responsibilities to the medical panel. Olsen, however, does 
not state which facts were left to the discretion of, or 
impermissibly found by the medical panel. More importantly, 
Olsen did not raise this issue in his Motion for Review 
before the Industrial Commission. As such, Olsen has waived 
-39-
his right to appeal on this issue. Pease v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 694 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1984). 
It is standard Industrial Commission practice to 
submit a summary of testimony to a medical panel to inform the 
panel of the factual circumstances of the case. A review of 
the Summary of Testimony in the instant case reveals that it 
contains all of the pertinent facts and circumstances 
surrounding Olsen's two heart attacks. Significantly, 
Olsen did not object to the Summary of Testimony either after 
it was prepared or after the medical panel issued its report. 
Accordingly, Olsen waived his right to object to the Summary 
of Testimony on appeal. Further, after reviewing the medical 
panel report, it is apparent that Dr. Preece was apprised of 
the facts of this case. Most importantly, the ALJ's finding of 
no medical causation was based on the "preponderance of medical 
evidence." (R. at 306.) In other words, there is substantial 
corroborative medical evidence which supports the conclusion of 
the medical panel. Based on the foregoing, Olsen7s argument 
that the Industrial Commission abdicated its responsibilities 
remains void of any substance. 
Finally, Olsen alludes to the argument that the 
deterioration of a condition caused by an industrial accident 
is also compensable. (Appellant's Brief, p. 14.) Respondents 
fully concur in this statement of the law. However, this 
argument again sidesteps the threshold issue — medical 
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causation. In other words, Olsen had the burden to establish 
that his present disabilities were caused by the 1984 heart 
attack. The ALJ, the Industrial Commission and the Utah Court 
of Appeals rejected this argument. 
Olsen's deterioration argument is also without 
merit because Olsen was released to return to work without 
limitation following his 1984 heart attack. (R. at 123.) In 
fact, the applicant's treating physician, Dr. Ace Madsen, 
stated that he "would unequivocally recommend [Olsen] for 
working under any conditions." (R. at 125.) In a follow-up 
visit on August 6, 1985, Dr. Madsen again stated that the 
applicant had fully recovered from the 1984 heart attack: 
"[Olsen] is doing very well . . . and is physically 
fit. . . . Patient is quite stable and doing very well without 
any problems." (R. at 127.) Further, Dr. Preece stated that 
the 1984 heart attack did not incapacitate Olsen, whereas the 
1985 heart attack did. (R. at 282.) Based on these opinions, 
Olsen failed to establish that his current disabilities were 
caused by the 1984 heart attack. 
CONCLUSION 
With respect to findings of fact, this court has a 
strictly limited and deferential standard of review. The 
-41-
question thus becomes whether the finding that Olsen failed 
to establish medical causation is arbitrary, capricious and 
without any substantial support in the record. 
The ALJ found that Olsen's work activities of 
November, 1985, were unrelated to the heart attack that Olsen 
experienced while he was on a "relaxing vacation in Colorado." 
(R. at 73-74.) Additionally, Olsen7s 1985 heart attack 
occurred ten days after his final day of work at Tyger 
Construction. Xd. Given these undisputed facts, Olsen's 
claim that his 1985 heart attack constitutes a compensable 
accident is untenable. 
The ALJ also found that Olsen failed to sustain his 
burden of proof with respect to medical causation. This 
finding was based on the conclusions of well-respected 
cardiologists. Although Olsen presented some conflicting 
medical evidence by a family physician, the ALJ adopted what he 
believed was the "preponderance of medical evidence." (R. at 
338.) 
In Lancaster v. Gilbert Development, this court 
held that it was the sole responsibility of the ALJ to weigh 
conflicting medical evidence, and to apply that evidence within 
the Allen framework. Therefore, because the ALJ's finding of 
no medical causation is amply supported by the preponderance of 
medical evidence, the applicable standard of review mandates 
affirmance of the decision below. 
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March, 1990. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this *7 ~~ day of 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
&*Lt- [kfa&< '44rt£>i^ 
MICHAEL E. DYER 
BRAD C. BETEBENNER 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Respondents Tyger Construction 
& Wausau Insurance Company 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 86000411 
* 
DOUGLAS R. OLSEN, * 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
VS. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
* 
TYCER CONSTRUCTION and /or * AND ORDER 
VAUSAU INSURANCE C0MTA3Y and * 
SECOND INJURY FUND * 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on September 16, 
1986 at 10:00 a.m. o'clock. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and represented by Robert J. 
Shaughnessy, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Michael Dyer, 
Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Erie V. 
Boorman, Administrator. 
Following the evidentiary hearing, the matter was taken under 
advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. Thereafter, the case was referred 
to a medical panel whose report was received by the Commission. The medical 
panel report was mailed to the parties. The applicant, by and through 
counsel9 filed objections to the medical panel report supported by a report 
from the applicant's treating physician. The applicant waived any hearing on 
his objections. The applicant's treating physician, a family practitioner, 
concluded that the applicant's work activities of October 29, 1984, resulted 
in his heart attack of that date. By contrast, the medical panel cardiologist 
found that the applicants heart attack of October 29, 1984, WEB due to a 
blockage of his coronary artery due to pre-existing heart disease, and not due 
to any physical work he was performing on that date. Dr. Heuerr, Mr. Olsen's 
treating cardiologist in New Mexico, also indicates that the applicant's heart 
attacks of October 29, 1984, and December 2, 1985, were due to 
arteriosclerotic coronary disease. 
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The applicant's objection to the medical panel report also indicates 
that the heart attack of December 2, 1985, was directly related to the heart 
attack of October 29, 1984, as found by the applicants treating family 
practitioner. Dr. Davidson. The doctor concluded, when asked if the December 
2, 1985 heart attack was causally related to the heart attack of October 29, 
1984: ~l cannot describe a direct causal relationship, but the second event 
was directly related, in fact a recurrence, of the myocardial infarction that 
took place October 29, 1984." The Administrative Law Judge must respectively 
disagree with Dr. Davidson in this regard, since her foregoing finding is 
contrary to the overwhelming medical evidence contained on the file. For 
example, Dr. Perry, a cardiologist, fct:nd that: 
Clearly the inferior wall myocardial infarction was caused 
by acute occlusion of a vessel not involved with his first 
myocardial infarction directly. 
From this I would definitely stated there was no direct 
relationship between his first myocardial infarction and 
the second myocardial infarction fourteen months later in 
December of 1985. 
The panel also found no causal relationship between the heart attack 
of December 2, 1985, and the heart attack of October 29, 1984. 
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the overwhelming 
preponderance of the medical evidence on this file supports the findings of 
the medical panel, and accordingly the objections of the applicant to the 
medical panel report are hereby dismissed. The medical panel report is 
admitted into evidence. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
Douglas R. Olsen was hired by Tyger Construction as a laborer in 
April of 1984, to work on the Stillwater Dam project. In July of 1984, the 
applicant was asked to become the operator of the crushing plant. This job 
involved working in a trailer and working the control board. The applicant 
was then promoted to the night foreman of the maintenance crew of the crushing 
plant. On this job, he would work anywhere from eight to twelve hours per 
night. 
On October 29, 1984, the applicant started working at 6:00 p.m. It 
was cold and he had on heavy clothing which was normal for this time of year. 
The maintenance crew used portable welding machines as part of their 
equipment. These machines would sit outside and would thaw out during the 
day, but by the time he reported for work at 6:00 p.m. the machines would be 
frozen to the ground. On this date, they had hooked one of the 500 amp 
welding machines to a truck and were attempting to move it when they 
discovered it was frozen to the ground. The applicant and two other workers 
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then took hold of the tongue of the trailer upon which the welding machine was 
mounted, and tugged on it with all of their strength. The trailer tongue came 
loose, and they then attached it to the truck. 
The applicant then went and sat in a pickup, and after approximately 
five minutes he felt a pain and some pressure in his left chest. The pain 
intensified, and the applicant started to notice that he was sweaty and clarmy 
and his left arm started to hurt. He then went to the trailer, and was then 
taken to the medical trailer. He was seen by the EKT, and when his condition 
did not improve he was taken by ambulance to the Duschene County Hospital. 
There he came under the treatment of Dr. Ace Madsen, who advised him that he 
was having a heart attack. He was given an injection of Streptokinase. After 
his condition stabilized, he was then transferred to the LDS Hospital where he 
came under the treatment of Dr. Laser. Dr. Laser arranged for an angiogram, 
and Hr. Olsen was given an angioplasty. He was then discharged from the 
hospital four or five days later. He returned to the Roosevelt area, and 
received follow up care from Dr. Madsen. On December 3, 1984, the applicant 
was released by Dr. Madsen to return to work with no limitations. He was paid 
temporary total disability for the period October 30, 1984 through December 2, 
1984. 
When the applicant returned to work, the maintenance was now being 
handled by the daytime crew, so Mr. Olsen returned to his job as the crusher 
operator. He continued to work in that capacity until December 22, 1984, when 
the employees of the crusher were laid off because everything would freeze up 
in the crusher. 
In January of 1985, the applicant was called back to work as a crane 
operator. This job consisted solely of sitting and operating hand controls 
inside a crane. The applicant continued this job until June of 1985, when he 
was placed in charge of the ready-mix concrete plants. The applicant was in 
charge of three plants, and between June and October of 1985, he was working 
60 hours per week. He testified that one of the conveyor belts from the 
concrete plant ran to the dam sight and that belt was on a 7 degree angle 
running downhill. The belt was approximately a mile long. While walking up 
this belt in September of 1985, the applicant started noticing what he thought 
was heart burn high in his stomach and low chest area. He would have to stop 
and catch his breath for three or four minutes, and he would also take a Turns 
or Eolaids and the heart burn would go away. He denied having this heart burn 
at any other time other than while walking up a conveyor belt. Ha also 
indicated that his heart burn became more and more frequent. By Movembar of 
1985, the applicant stated that they were working seven days per week working 
very long hours, and that they were only getting approximately five or six 
hours per night of sleep. Since they exceeded the quota of concrete which had 
been set by the company, the entire operation was shut down on lovember 22, 
1985. The applicant was then able to leave Altamont and take his 40 foot 
trailer to Ignatio, Colorado to a friend's farm. Upon his arrival, he and his 
wife relaxed, since there was nothing else to do in the area. 
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On December 2, 1985, at approximately 6:00 a.m., the applicant woke 
up with a severe case of heartburn. The heart burn went all the way to the 
roof of his mouth and after taking some medication, he noticed no 
improvement. He then roused his wife and she took him to the Mercy Medical 
Center in Durango, Colorado where he was treated by Dr. Wilson. The applicant 
was placed in the ICCU for approximately a week and was also given a double 
dose of Streptokinase, but with no improvement. While his doctor was treating 
him the applicant had a heart attack in his presence. He was then given the 
option of being transferred to Salt Lake City, Denver or Albuquerque. The 
applicant chose the Presbyterian Hospital in Albuquerque since it was closest 
to his home. He was initially treated with an angiogram, and was scheduled 
for angioplasty, but was informed that the status of his heart would not 
tolerate that procedure without the installation of a pump. A pump was 
installed and the angioplasty was performed. Mr. Olsen was advised that he 
would not be a good candidate for by pass surgery, since his heart could not 
withstand that procedure because the applicant has ischemic cardiomyopathy. 
He has been told that he may have to receive a heart transplant in four or 
five years. He was released with "a bunch of restrictions**9 so he traveled to 
Arizona for some warm weather. 
The applicant applied for social security benefits, and after an 
initial denial, has been granted benefits. 
In his early 209s Mr. Olsen broke his right leg in a snowmobile 
accident. In 1970, he lost part of his right index finger in an industrial 
accident he sustained in upper Michigan. He has previously been compensated 
for that injury. The applicant denied any prior heart problems or chest 
pain. In July of 1986, Mr. Olsen had a gallbladder problem which eventually 
resulted in surgery. 
The file indicates several positive risk factors for heart attack. 
The applicant's family history indicates that his father died at the age of 56 
of a heart attack, and that he had also had three heart attacks in his 40*s. 
Mr. Olsen9s father also had diabetes and he has two brothers that also have 
that condition. The applicant's mother has high blood pressure as does the 
applicant. Mr. Olsen started smoking at age 16 and smoked one pack per day. 
He discontinued smoking in 1982, and had put on some weight as a result. Just 
before his heart attack of October 29, 1984, he had resumed smoking again. 
The applicant9* medical records indicate that he has high cholesterol levels 
and elevated LOL and trigylceride levels. 
With the file in this posture, the case was referred to a medical 
panel for its evaluation. The medical panel found that there was no medical 
causal relation between the applicant's heart attack of October 29, 1984, and 
his work activities of that date. The panel found that the cause of the 
applicant9s heart attack was due to "progressive atherosclerotic blockage of 
the coronary artery9*. The panel concluded that the applicant9s heart attack 
"was simply due to the combination of pre-disposing factors Which he had at 
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the time. We would not attribute any causative role to any physical work 
which he was doing at the time." With respect to the heart attack of December 
2, 1985, the panel found no causal connection between it and the attack of 
October 29, 1984. Rather the panel found that the attack was caused by the 
applicant's premature pre-existing atherosclerosis. It should also be noted 
that the first heart attack involved an acute anterior wall myocardial 
infarction. By comparison, the second attack involved the inferior left 
ventricle wall. Dr. Perry, a cardiologist, concluded that "clearly the 
inferior wall myocardial infarction was caused by acute occlusion of a vessel 
not involved with his first myocarcial infarction directly. The applicant's 
treating physician, Dr. Davidson, also fails to attribute a direct causal 
connection between the activities of October 29, 1984 and the attack of 
December 2, 1985. The Administrative Law Judge, after considering all of the 
evidence, adopts the findings of the medical panel as his own. 
Because of the pre-existing heart disease, it is necessary to apply 
the test of Allen v. Industrial Commission concerning legal causation. The 
activities of October 29, 1984 must have amounted to exertion beyond what the 
applicant would have expended in the activities of every day life. Giving the 
applicant the benefit of the doubt, I find his exertion in lifting the trailer 
tongue may be extraordinary and therefore would satisfy the legal causation 
requirement of Allen. However, the applicant must also satisfy the medical 
causation test of Allen. Based on the findings of the medical panel and the 
preponderance of medical evidence, and considering the applicant's positive 
risk factors for heart disease, I conclude that he has not satisfied the 
medical causation requirement of the Allen accident test. Accordingly, the 
applicant's claim must be denied. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant has not sustained his burden of proving that his heart 
condition was medically caused by his work activities of October 29, 1984. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Douglas Olsen for 
compensation benefits for an industrial accident on October 29, 1984, should 
be, and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
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spec i fy ing i n d e t a i l the particular errors and object ions , and, unless so 
f i l e d , t h i s Order s h a l l be f inal and not subjec t to review or appeal. 
Timothy C. AJft^ fl"' 
AdminislrraT^va Law Judge 
Passed by the Indus tr ia l Commission 
of Utah, S a l t Lake City, Utah, t h i s 
i P . ^ f e - d a y off February, 1988. 
ATTEST: 
Linda J . S t r i s W i r g 
Commission Secretary 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No: 86000411 
DOUGLAS R. OLSEN, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
TYCER CONSTRUCTION and/or 
WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANY and 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
Defendants. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On February 26, 1988, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying 
workers compensation benefits for the above-referenced applicant's December 2, 
1985 myocardial infarction and denying additional workers compensation 
benefits for a October 29, 1984 myocardial infarction incurred by the 
applicant. The Administrative Law Judge based his denial on the conclusions 
of the medical panel doctor, Dr. M. Preece. Dr. Preece concluded that the 
October 29, 1984 myocardial infarction was not caused by exertion at work and 
that the December 2, 1985 myocardial infarction was also not caused by work, 
nor related to the October 29, 1984 myocardial infarction. 
Prior to the examination and report of Dr. Preece, two other doctor 
opinions had been rendered regarding the medical cause of the applicant's 
myocardial infarction. Dr. J. Perry reviewed the applicant's medical records, 
and without addressing the cause of the 1984 myocardial infarction, stated 
with definity in a letter dated March 10, 1986 that the 1985 myocardial 
infarction was in no way related to the 1984 myocardial infarction. Dr. R. 
Heuser similarly reviewed records regarding the 1984 myocardial infarction and 
stated in a letter dated March 12, 1986 that he felt the 1985 myocardial 
infarction was related to the 1984 infarction. Also, just prior to the 
issuance of the Administrative Law Judge's Order, in connection with the 
applicant's Objections to the medical panel report, a letter from Dr. A. M. 
Davidson, the applicant's "primary care physician," was submitted stating that 
the applicant's 1984 infarction was work related and that the 1985 infarction 
was "directly related" to the 1984 infarction. 
With 'the above-listed medical evidence submitted, the Administrative 
Law Judge determined that the medical panel report should be adopted as the 
preponderance of the medical evidence was supportive of the conclusions of the 
medical panel doctor. On March 30, 1988, counsel for the applicant filed a 
Motion for Review contesting the Administrative Law Judge's adoption of the 
* 
* 
* ORDER DENYING 
* 
* MOTION FOR REVIEW 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* * * * * 
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••dical panel report. Counsel for the applicant raises two major issues in 
*it Motion for Review. First, counsel for the applicant notes that this is 
lb* first medical report he has ever seen where the doctor has stated that 
»ontemporaneuous exertional activities in no way contributed to the heart 
ftilure. Second, counsel for the applicant notes that it is inconsistent for 
:he Administrative Law Judge to find that the 1984 infarction is not 
compensable as the defendants accepted liability for that incident and paid 
benefits for it. 
On April 199 1988, counsel for the defendants filed a Response to the 
ipplicant's Motion for Review. Addressing the two points raised by counsel 
or the applicant, counsel for the defendants first points out that it is not 
or the applicant's counsel to determine what is "mainstream*9 medical 
ipinion. In addressing the second issue, counsel for the defendants states 
hat the payment of benefits by the defendant/carrier is not equivalent to an 
cceptance of liability. In the alternative, counsel for the defendants 
rgues that even if the defendants did accept liability for the 1984 
nfarction by paying benefits, this does not mean that liability for the 1985 
nfarction necessarily follows, as it is clear in the majority of the medical 
vidence that the 1984 and 1985 infarction are not causally related. 
The Commission finds that the only issue on review is whether the 
dministrative Law Judge correctly determined that there is insufficient 
vidence to support a finding of medical causation. This case is unusual in 
he diversity of medical opinion presented. Several of the doctors who have 
endered opinions regarding the causation issue have stated conclusions that 
re exactly the opposite of another doctor. In cases where medical opinion 
ontroverting that of the medical panel is submitted, the Commission has in 
he past maintained a fairly consistent practice of deferring to the medical 
anel absent good reason shown why the medical panel report is insufficient or 
iased. In the instant case, the medical panel doctor is a well respected 
pecialist in cardiology and his report is clear and unequivocal regarding his 
onclusions that the infarction was caused by pre-existing conditions and not 
xertional activity. Although Dr. Heuser and Dr. Davidson make contrary 
onclusions, the reasons for those conclusions are not stated. In contrast, 
he medical panel doctor*s conclusions are explained with a listing given of 
he numerous pre-existing conditions suffered by the applicant predisposing 
im to cardiac arrest. There appears no good reason to reject the medical 
anel report, there being no insufficiency in the explanation and no bias, 
herefore, the Commission must deny the applicant's Motion for Review and 
ff irm the 'Administrative Law Judge. 
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ORDER-' 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicants, March 30, 1988 Motion 
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's February 26, 1988 
Order is hereby affirmed and final with further review to the Court of Appeals 
only within the thirty (30) day time limit as specified in U.C.A. 35-1-83. 
fKomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
/^ fe day of 4**y, 1988. 
ATTEST: (2jUsfU-^ 
Linda J. >£Xrasburs 
Commission Secretary 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on June J__% 1988, a copy of the attached ORDER 
3S.VYING MOTION FOR REVIEW in the case of DOUGLAS R. OLSEN was mailed to the 
following persons at the following addresses, postage paid: 
Douglas R. Olsen 
P. 0. Box 687 
Mancos, CO 81328 
Robert J. Shaughnessy 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 963 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Michael Dyer 
Attorney at Law 
P. 0. Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Wausau Insurance 
P. 0. Box 7400 
Murray, UT 84107 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund 
Richard G. Sumsion, Administrative Law Judge 
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge 
Janet L. Moffitt, Administrative Law Judge 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Pamela Hayes / 
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language of the insurance policy states 
that defects created by the insured, i.e. 
Valley Bank, are excluded from coverage. 
We next address Valley Bank's claim 
that exclusions for defects created by the 
insured should not be enforced in the ab-
sence of fraud or misconduct on the part of 
the insured. Valley Bank cites a number 
of cases in support of its proposition. See, 
e.g., American Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Law-
yers Title Ins. Corp., 793 F.2d 780 (6th 
Cir.1986); Brown v. St Paul Title Ins. 
Corp., 634 F.2d 1103 (8th Cir.1980); Taus-
sig v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 171 F.2d 
553 (7th Cir.1948); Conway v. Title Ins. 
Co., 291 Ala. 76, 277 So.2d 890 (1973); Gin-
ger v. American Title Ins. Co., 29 Mich. 
App. 279, 185 N.W.2d 54 (1971); Feldman 
v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 87 NJ.Super. 
391, 209 A.2d 640 (1965). 
After reviewing these cases, we find 
they are all either factually distinguishable 
from this case, or do not support Valley 
Bank's proposition. For instance, in Amer-
ican Savings and Loan, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals declared that an insured 
"creates" a defect if the lien " Resulted 
from some intentional misconduct or ... 
the insured either expressly or impliedly 
.. . agreed to the defects . . . in the course 
of purchasing the property involved/" 
793 F.2d at 784 (quoting Brown v. SL Paul 
Title Ins. Co., 634 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 n. 8 
(8th Cir.1980)) (emphasis added). See also 
Feldman, 209 A.2d at 647-48 (created 
means some affirmative act bringing the 
defect into "fruition"). See generally An-
notation, Title Insurance: Exclusion of 
Liability for Defects, Liens, or Encum-
brances Created, Suffered, Assumed, or 
Agreed to by the Insured, 87 A.LR.3d 515, 
516-17 (1978). 
We decline to rewrite4 or read into Val-
ley Bank's policy of title insurance that the 
insurer must establish the insured was 
guilty of fraud or misconduct before invok-
ing the protections of the exclusionary 
clause. Moreover, had the parties intended 
such a restriction, they could have easily 
«• S*e Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129, 132 
(U;ah Ct.App.1989) ("it is not the function of a 
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provided for the same through the terms of 
the policy itself. Cf. Zions First Nat'I 
Bank, 749 P.2d at 654 ("if something 
broader . . . was intended by [the] lan-
guage, certainly the drafter . . . could have 
included appropriate language"); Drau-
ghon, 771 P.2d at 1107. 
In sum, we hold Valley Bank intentional-
ly and deliberately "created" the SBA trust 
deed lien, and it is therefore, expressly 
excepted from coverage under the terms of 
Valley Bank's policy. Accordingly, the tri-
al court's judgment is affirmed. 
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ., 
concur. 
(O f «Y HUMH SYSTW> 
Douglas R. OLSEN, Petitioner, 
• . 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Tyger Construction, Wausau Insurance 
Company, and Second Injury Fund, Re-
spondents. 
No. 880407-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 23, 1989. 
Workers' compensation claimant ap-
plied for additional benefits for earlier 
heart attack as well as benefits for second 
heart attack, alleging that they were caus-
ally related. The Industrial Commission 
denied workers' compensation benefits, and 
claimant appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Billings, J., held that (1) evidence sup-
ported determination that neither heart at-
tack was medically related to claimant's 
employment activities; (2) mere fact that 
employer paid benefits initially without 
contesting liability did not estop it from 
court to rewrite an unambiguous contract"). 
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contesting liability for additional benefits; 
and (3) Industrial Commission's review of 
request for additional benefits for first 
heart attack was not limited to considera-
tion of whether claimant's condition had 
deteriorated, since Commission had never 
formally considered petitioner's initial 
claim arising from first heart attack. 
Affirmed. 
1. Workers' Compensation e»1546 
Determination that workers' compen-
sation claimant's heart attacks were not 
medically related to his employment activi-
ties was not arbitrary or capricious or with-
out any reasonable basis in evidence, even 
though Industrial Commission discounted 
opinions of claimant's experts and adopted 
opinion of medical panel, where there was 
competent medical evidence in record that 
heart attacks were result of premature ath-
eroclerosis and claimant's major risk 
factors for heart disease. 
2. Workers* Compensation <*»1357, 1937 
Dicta in which Industrial Commission 
improperly suggested that it could afford 
presumption of correctness to medical pan-
el's opinion, although inappropriate, was 
harmless where it did not appear to have 
affected Commission's decision. 
3. Workers' Compensation 4=>1303 
Mere fact that employer pays workers' 
compensation benefits initially without con-
testing liability does not mean that it is 
thereafter, as matter of law, estopped from 
contesting liability. 
4. Workers' Compensation *=>1303 
Workers' compensation claimant failed 
to establish that his employer was estopped 
from contesting its liability for additional 
benefit for earlier heart attack for which 
claimant had received temporary disability 
benefits, where claimant failed to demon-
strate, among other things, that he 
changed his position or relinquished any 
rights as result of receiving such benefits. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-78. 
5. Workers' Compensation «»2077 
Where Industrial Commission's review 
of request for additional benefits for work-
er's compensation claimant's earlier heart 
attack was not limited to consideration of 
whether claimant's condition had dete-
riorated, where employer had voluntarily 
paid temporary disability benefits and Com. 
mission had thus never formally considered 
initial claim. 
Jay A. Meservy, Salt Lake City, for peti-
tioner. 
Michael E. Dyer and Brad C. Betebenner, 
Salt Lake City, for respondents Tyger 
Const, and Wausau Ins. Co. 
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent Second Injury Fund. 
Before DAVIDSON, BENCH and 
BILLINGS, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
Petitioner Douglas Olsen appeals from 
the Industrial Commission s decision deny-
ing him workers' compensation benefits for 
injuries he suffered as a result of two 
separate heart attacks. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Petitioner was hired by Tyger Construe-
tion as a laborer in April 1984. It is undis-
puted that prior to his employment with 
Tyger, petitioner had a famfy history of 
heart attacks, diabetes, and high blood 
pressure, and a personal history of smok-
ing approximately one pack of cigarettes 
per day since age 16, and high blood choles-
terol and triglyceride levels, all of which 
predisposed petitioner to heart disease. On 
October 29, 1984, petitioner suffered a 
heart attack while at work. He was subse-
quently diagnosed as having suffered an 
acute anterior wall myocardial infarction. 
Petitioner was hospitalized for sever»l 
days, and received uncontested temporary 
total disability benefits for the period Octo-
ber 30, 1984, through December 2, 19S4. 
On December 3, 1984, petitioner was re-
leased by his attending physician and in-
formed that he could return to work with-
out limitation. 
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In June 1985, petitioner was assigned by 
Tyger to supervise several concrete plants. 
Between June and October of 1985, peti-
tioner claimed he worked sixty hours per 
week. By November 1985, petitioner was 
working seven days a week until the plants 
supervised by petitioner were shut down on 
November 22, 1985. Following the shut 
down, petitioner and his wife traveled to 
Colorado for a vacation. On December 2, 
1985, petitioner suffered a second heart 
attack. The second heart attack was diag-
nosed as a myocardial infarction involving 
the inferior left ventricle wall and rendered 
him permanently and totally disabled. 
Following the second heart attack, peti-
tioner filed two claims for disability bene-
fits. One claim requested additional bene-
fits for the 1984 heart attack, the second 
for injuries suffered as a result of the 1985 
heart attack. The administrative law judge 
conducted an evidentiary hearing and re-
ferred its summation of the evidence to a 
medical panel doctor. Although there was 
conflicting medical evidence in the record, 
the administrative law judge ultimately 
adopted the findings expressed by the 
medical panel doctor, Dr. Preece. Based 
on these findings, the administrative law 
judge denied both claims. The Commission 
affirmed the administrative law judge's de-
termination concluding: 1) petitioner's 1985 
heart attack was not related to or precip-
itated by his 1984 heart attack, and 2) 
neither the 1984 heart attack nor the 1985 
heart attack was medically related to peti-
tioner's employment activities. 
Petitioner appeals from the Commis-
sion's decision claiming: 1) both heart at-
tacks were compensable industrial acci-
dents and the Commission's determination 
that no medical causation existed was arbi-
trary and capricious, and 2) since Tyger 
paid petitioner disability benefits for the 
1984 heart attack, it is estopped from chal-
lergir g its liability in these proceedings, 
and the Commission erred in failing to so 
determine. 
*• Th.s* proceedings were commenced before 
*he effective date of the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-46b-l to 
~221! 938 Supp.). For a recent case discussing the 
KL COM'N OF UTAH Utah 939 
1 (UuhApp. 19S9) 
MEDICAL CAUSATION 
[1] Petitioner claims the medical testi-
mony demonstrates that both his 1984 and 
1985 heart attacks were medically related 
to his employment activities. Legal causa-
tion is not disputed. Thus, our review is 
limited to whether the Commission's deter-
mination that petitioner's heart attacks 
were not medically related to his employ-
ment activities was arbitrary and capri-
cious or "without any reasonable basis in 
the evidence'' to support it See, e.g., 
Rush ton v. Gelco Express, 732 P.2d 109, 
111 (Utah 1986).1 
To demonstrate "medical causation," pe-
titioner must introduce evidence establish-
ing "that the stress, strain, or exertion 
required by his or her occupation led to the 
resulting injury or disability." Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15, 27 (Utah 
1986). For this purpose, petitioner prof-
fered the written medical opinions of his 
two attending physicians, Dr. Heuser, a 
cardiologist, and Dr. Davidson, a family 
practitioner. Dr. Davidson concluded peti-
tioner's 1984 heart attack was related to 
his employment activities and the 1985 
heart attack was a recurrence of the 1984 
heart attack. Dr. Heuser similarly con-
cluded that the heart attacks were related 
but did not express an opinion concerning 
their relationship to petitioner's work activ-
ities. 
However, after examining the petitioner 
and reviewing the administrative law 
judge's summation of the evidence and pe-
titioner's medical records, Dr. Preece, the 
medical panel doctor, concluded petitioner's 
heart attacks resulted from preexisting 
medical conditions, and were not related to 
his employment activities. Specifically, Dr. 
Preece concluded the petitioner's 1984 
heart attack resulted from a blocked coro-
nary artery. Dr. Preece believed the block-
age was due to preexisting heart disease, 
and not due to any physical work the peti-
tioner performed on the day of his attack. 
Dr. Preece similarly concluded the 1985 
heart attack was a result of premature 
Act's effect on the standard for reviewing agency 
findings of fact, see Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63, 66-6S (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
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atherosclerosis and not petitioner's work 
activities preceding the attack. In his let-
ter to the administrative law judge, Dr. 
Preece wrote: 
In summary, . . . we have an early mid-
dle-aged male wljp is unfortunate enough 
to have had two separate myocardial in-
farctions. He obviously has premature 
atherosclerosis and we would attribute 
this to his major risk factors including 
the cigarette smoking, the elevated blood 
cholesterol, and particularly the positive 
family history for coronary artery dis-
ease. 
[2] Petitioner's claim, therefore, is that 
the Commission acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously by discounting the opinions of his 
experts and adopting the opinion of the 
medical panel.1 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly 
stated that where the medical evidence is 
conflicting, "it is the responsibility of the 
administrative law judge to resolve factual 
conflicts." Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev.t 736 
P.2d 237, 241 (Utah 1987). Moreover, we 
do not deem the Commission's findings ar-
bitrary and capricious "simply because the 
Commission adopted the findings of the 
panel rather than those of the independent 
physicians " Rekward v. Industrial 
Comm% 755 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah CtApp. 
1988). Accordingly, we find there was 
competent, comprehensive medical evidence 
in the record upon which the Commission 
could rely in concluding that petitioner's 
heart attacks were not medically related to 
2. Petitioner also claims the Commission im-
properly afforded greater weight to the medical 
panel's opinion. Specifically, the Commission 
wrote: 
In cases where medical opinion controverting 
that of the medical panel is submitted, the 
Commission has in the past maintained a fair-
ly consistent practice of deferring to the medi-
cal panel absent good reason shown why the 
medical panel report is insufficient or biased. 
In the instant case, the medical panel doctor 
is a well respected specialist in cardiology and 
his report is clear and unequivocal regarding 
his conclusions that the infarction was caused 
by pre-existing conditions and not exertional 
activity. Although Dr. Heuser and Dr. David-
son make contrary conclusions, the reasons 
for those conclusions are not stated. In con-
trast, the medical panel doctor's conclusions 
are explained with a listing given [sic] of the 
numerous pre-existing conditions suffered by 
his employment activities, and thus we re-
ject this aspect of petitioner's challenge. 
REOPENING LIABILITY FOR 1984 
HEART ATTACK 
Petitioner also filed a claim for additional 
benefits relating to the 1984 heart attack, 
claiming that since he had received the 
temporary disability benefits, his condition 
had deteriorated. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-78 (1988). The Commission, again 
relying on the opinions of the medical pan-
el, rejected .petitioner's claim. Instead, the 
Commission concluded the 1984 heart at-
tack was not a compensable industrial acci-
dent because it was not medically related 
to petitioner's employment activities. Peti-
tioner claims the Board was precluded 
from "reopening" the initial question of 
compensibility of the prior 1984 heart at-
tack because Tyger had voluntarily paid 
benefit*. Therefore, petitioner argues 
Tyger is estopped from now denying that 
his injury was compensable under the 
Workers' Compensation Act Petitioner 
further argues the Commission's review 
should have been limited to a consideration 
of whether his condition had deteriorated, 
which if answered in the affirmative, enti-
tled him to additional disability benefits. 
[3,4] Petitioner's position fails for two 
reasons. First, the mere fact that an em-
ployer pays benefits initially without con-
testing liability does not mean it is there-
after, as a matter of law, barred from 
contesting liability. See, e.g., Crow v. In-
the applicant predisposing him to cardiac ar-
rest. 
Petitioner claims the Commission granted the 
medical panel's expert opinion a presumption of 
correctness, contrary to Utah law. See, e.g.. 
Rushton v. Gtlco Express, 732 P.2d 109. 111-12 
(Utah 19S6). We agree the Commissions state-
ments are inappropriate. The Commission 
must always weigh conflicting evidence in light 
of materiality, credibility, and competency, 
among other recognized considerations, without 
any preconceived deference to either side-
However, we are not persuaded the Commis-
sion's unfortunate d-cta affected its decision. 
Taken in the context of the Commission's fur-
ther elaborations, it is clear that the Commis-
sion also considered acceptable factors, and 
found the medical panel opinion more credible 
and based on specific preexisting conditions suf-
fered by petitioner. 
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dustrial Comm\ 104 Utah 333, 140 P.2d 
321, 321-22 (1943); Harding v. Industrial 
Comm% 83 Utah 376, 28 P.2d 182, 184 
(1934); Taggart v. Industrial Comm% 79 
Utah 598, 12 P.2d 356, 357 (1932). In Har-
ding, the Utah Supreme Court wrote: 
Ordinarily, in the absence of prejudice to 
the employee or of facts giving rise to 
estoppel, an insurance earner may, not-
withstanding voluntary payment of com-
pensation, the furnishing of hospital or 
medical care, the entry of appearance, or 
statement made that the policy covered 
the employee, urge the defense that the 
employee did not meet with an accident, 
... or that there was no causal connec-
tion between the injury and disability. 
28 P.2d at 184. Petitioner has failed to 
allege sufficient facts to establish that 
Tyger should be estopped from contesting 
its liability for the 1984 heart attack. For 
Instance, petitioner has not demonstrated 
that he changed his position or relinquished 
any rights as a result of receiving tempo-
rary disability payments. Cf. Crow, 140 
P.2d at 321. 
Moreover, adopting the position urged by 
petitioner would encourage employers to 
contest all employment related injuries to 
avoid later being estopped from raising 
their claims. 
It would be unjust to both the employee 
and the insurance carrier if the law were 
that when the insurance carrier once un-
dertakes to provide medical or other care 
for an injured [employee] it has lost all 
right to afterwards defend against what 
it believes to be an unjust or illegal 
claim. The insurance carrier cannot and 
ought not wait until full investigation 
has been made before providing neces-
sary care and treatment for injured [em-
ployees]. 
Harding, 28 P.2d at 184. See generally, 4 
Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law 
§ 82.61 at 15-1215 to 15-1224 (1989) (volun-
to-y payment does not constitute an 
award" for which proceedings may be re-
opened nor does it waive the employer's 
n£h: to later dispute the claim). 
[5] A second reason for rejecting peti-
tioner's claim is that petitioner's 1984 heart 
attack was never formally considered by 
^e Industrial Commission. Thus, the 
v. SALT LAKE COUNTY Utah 941 
I! (UuhApp. I9S9) 
Commission did not "reopen" the issue of 
compensability, but rather reviewed peti-
tioner's heart attack for the first time. Ac-
cordingly, we review the Commission's de-
termination with respect to the 1984 heart 
attack under the same standard of review 
previously set forth in this opinion, and our 
conclusion remains the same—there is sub-
stantial, competent medical testimony sup-
porting the Commission's conclusion that 
petitioner's 1984 heart attack was not medi-
cally related to his employment activities. 
Based on the foregoing, the Commis-
sion's determination denying petitioner dis-
ability benefits is affirmed. 
DAVIDSON and BENCH, JJ., 
concur. 
FASHION PLACE INVESTMENT, LTD., 
a partnership, aka Fashion Place Asso-
ciates, Fashion Place Investors Ltd., a 
limited partnership, Capitol Life Insur-
ance Company, Valley Mortgage Com-
pany, Dr. Robert Anderson, Dr. Barlow 
L. Packer, Dr. Orlando T. Barrowes, 
Dr. Carlson Terry, Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, 
v. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, et 
al., Defendants and Respondents. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY/SALT LAKE 
COUNTY MENTAL HEALTH, et al. 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Richard HARMAN, d/b/a Building 
Management Services, and Safeco In-
surance Company, et al., Third-Party 
Defendants. 
No. 870553-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 26, 1989. 
Landlord's insurer sought subrogation 
against tenant for damages resulting from 
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MAR 13 N86 Mr. Dick Sagara 
WAUSAU Insurance Co. 
P.O. Box 7400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
RE: MR. DOUGLAS RONALD OLSEN 
Dear Mr. Sagara: 
I have reviewed the records of Douglas Ronald Olsen who is a 44 
year old who has suffered an acute anterior wall myocardial infarction on about 
October 28, 1984. Details of his activity and precipitating factors were not 
included in the material sent to me. He was transferred from Roosevelt to LDS 
Hospital in Salt Lake City three days later where he underwent heart catheter-
ization and a coronary angioplasty on November 2nd. The heart catheterization 
at that time revealed multivessel disease with severe stenosis, presumably re-
sponsible for his myocardial infarction and a blockage of intermediate severity 
in a separate coronary artery, the right coronary artery. 
Fourteen months after his initial myocardial infarction of the 
anterior wall, he suffered a myocardial infarction involving his inferior left 
ventricular wall. Repeat coronary angiography done December 16, 1985 revealed 
a total occlusion of the right coronary artery where he previously had the 
50% stenosis documented in the catheterization at LDS Hospital in November of 84, 
Clearly the inferior wall myocardial infarction was caused by acute occlusion of 
a vessel not involved with his first myocardial infarction directly. 
From this I would definitely state that there was no direct 
relationship between his first myocardial infarction and the second myocardial 
infarction fourteen months later in December of 1985. 
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact r^.e. 
Siacerely, 
J. Joseph Pe rrv/ M 
JJP/jv 
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Douglas 1. Olsen 
10/29/84 
Tyger Construction 
Uausau Insurance Companies 
86000411 
09/16/86, 10:00 a.m. 
Robert J. Shaughnessy, Attorney at Law 
Michael B. Dyer, Attorney at Law 
Joined 
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY 
Douglas R. Olsen was hired by Tyger Construction as a laborer in 
April of 1984 to work on the Stillwater Dam project. The Applicant had 
previously worked as a crane operator, and once he had worked for Tyger for 
four days, he was then assigned to work as a crane operator. Prior to taking 
a job with Tyger Construction, the Applicant was examined by Dr. Ace Madsen at 
the Roosevelt Clinic for a pre-employment physical. The Applicant testified 
that when he started working as a crane operator, he was erecting equipment 
and structures for the rock crushing operation, by using a crane. In July of 
1984 Mr. Olsen was asked to become the operator of the crushing plant. This 
job involved working in a trailer and running a control board. The Applicant 
was then promoted to the night foreman of the maintenance crew of the crushing 
plant. On this job, the Applicant testified that they were working anywhere 
from eight or ten or twelve hours per night. 
On October 29, 1984, the shift had started at approximately 6:00 
p.m. It was cold, and the Applicant had on heavy clothing, which was normal 
for this time of year in Duchesne County. The maintenance crew utilized 
portable welding machines as part of their equipment repair responsibility. 
The Applicant testified that the machines would sit outside and would thaw out 
during the day, but by the time they reported for work at 6:00 p.m., the 
machines would be frozen to the ground, which was the situation on October 29, 
1984. They had hooked one of the 500-amp welding machines to a truck and were 
attempting to move it when they discovered that it was frozen to the ground. 
The Applicant and two other workers then took hold of the tongue of the 
trailer up^n Which the welding machine was mounted and tugged on it with all 
of their might* The trailer tongue came loose, and they then attached it to 
the truck. The Applicant then went and sat in the pickup, and after 
approximately five minutes he felt a pain and some pressure in his left 
chest. The Applicant testified that the pain he felt was intense, and after 
they had stopped the truck, which was a few minutes later, he exited and then 
went and sat on a bank of dirt, thinking that his chest pain would go away. 
The chest pain did not go away, and the Applicant further testified that he 
was sweaty and clammy and that his left arm started to hurt. He then went to 
the trailer, and his condition worsened, so he had two of his people take him 
to the medical trailer there at the job site. He was seen by the EMT, who 
opined that since there had been numerous flu complaints, the Applicant might 
be having chest pains as a result of some flu. When the Applicant's condition 
did not improve, he was taken by ambulance to the Duchesne County Hospital, 
where he came under the treatment of Dr. Ace Madsen. Dr. Madsen advised the 
Applicant that he was having a heart attack, and he was then given an 
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injection of Streptokinase. At the time of his injury, the Applicant was 
working at an altitude of 8,200-8,300 feet. 
After his condition had stabilized at the Duchesne County Hospital, 
the Applicant was transferred to L.D.S. Hospital, where he came under the 
treatjuent of Dr. Laser. Dr. Laser arranged for the Applicant to receive an 
angiogram, and the Applicant was also given an angioplasty, which was 
performed by Dr. Laser. The Applicant was then discharged from the hospital 
approximately four or five days later, and he then returned to the Roosevelt 
area. He received follow-up care from Dr. Madsen, and on December 3, 1984, 
the Applicant was released to return to work with no ^  limitations. The 
Applicant was paid temporary total disability compensation for the period 
October 30, 1984, through December 2, 1984, 
When the Applicant returned to work on December 3, 1984, the 
maintenance, which had previously been performed at night, was now being 
performed by the daytime crew, so the Applicant was returned to his job as the 
crusher operator. He continued to work in this capacity until December 22, 
1984, when the employees of the crusher were laid off because everything would 
freeze up in the crusher. 
In January of 1985 the Applicant was requested to return to operate a 
crane, which was on a ledge on the side of a mountain. He was operating a 
250-foot boom which had a basket attached that he would use to haul workers 
who were engaged in the blasting of rock at the face of the mountain. The 
Applicant would sometimes move one basket per hour, or sometimes he would move 
the basket one time every three hours. This job consisted solely of sitting 
and operating hand controls. The Applicant continued this job until June of 
1985, when he was put in charge of the ready-mix concrete plants. The 
ready-mix plants had Plant No. 1 in operation and had a well-trained crew. 
However, Plant Nos. 2 and 3 were staffed by inexperienced personnel, and the 
Applicant was busy training these people until approximately mid-August of 
1985. There had also been three conveyor belts installed at the concrete 
plants for the purpose of moving the concrete from the plants to the dam 
site. The Applicant was in charge of the operation and setup of those 
conveyors, and between June and October of 1985 the Applicant was working 
sixty hours per week on a minimum. 
One of the conveyor belts from the concrete plant ran to the dam 
site, and the belt was on a seven-degree angle running downhill. The 
Applicant testified that it was "hellacious" coming back, in that it was a 
steep incline and the belt was a mile long. While walking up this belt in 
September of 1985, the Applicant started noticing what he thought was 
"heartburn" high in his stomach and low chest area. The Applicant would have 
to stop and catch his breath for approximately three or four minutes, and he 
would also take a Turns or Rolaids and the heartburn would go away. The 
Applicant denied having this "heartburn" at any other time other than while 
walking up the conveyor belt. He also testified that his heartburn became 
more and more frequent. By November of 1985 the Applicant stated that they 
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were working seven days per week, working very long hours, and that they were 
only getting approximately five or six hours per night of sleep. They had 
exceeded their quota of concrete which had been set by the company. Everyone 
was tired, and they were ready for a layoff. On November 22, 1985, the 
operation shut down, and the Applicant was able to leave Altamont and take his 
forty-foot trailer to Ignatio, Colorado, to a friend*s farm, since his home in 
Hancos, Colorado, was being rented out. The Applicant testified that upon his 
arrival, he and his wife just relaxed, since there was nothing else to do in 
that area. 
On December 2, 1985, at approximately 6:00 a.m., the Applicant woke 
up with a severe case of heartburn. The heartburn went all the way to the 
roof of his mouth, and after taking some heartburn medication, he noticed no 
improvement. He then roused his wife, and she took him to the Mercy Medical 
Center in Durango, Colorado, where he was treated by Dr. Bruce Wilson. The 
Applicant was placed in the ICCU for approximately a week and was also given a 
double dose of Streptokinase, but with no improvement. While his doctor was 
treating him, the Applicant had a heart attack in his presence. The Applicant 
was then given the option of being transferred to Salt Lake City, Denver, or 
Albuquerque. The Applicant chose the Presbyterian Hospital in Albuquerque, 
since it was closest to his home. He was then transferred to their care. He 
was initially treated with an angiogram, and was scheduled for angioplasty, 
but was informed that the status of his heart would not tolerate that 
procedure without the installation of a pump, A pump was installed, and then 
angioplasty was performed. The Applicant was advised that he would not be a 
good candidate for a bypass surgery, since his heart could not withstand that 
procedure. The Applicant has been told that he may have to receive a heart 
transplant in four or five years. He was released with "a bunch of 
restrictions,9' so he traveled to Mesa, Arizona, for some warm weather. He was 
staying at his in-laws' house and had been told by his doctor that he should 
walk as much as possible. He did so, and then noticed that he was having 
abdominal swelling. He was seen by a cardiologist in the Phoenix area, 
Dr. Mark Stern, who informed him that his heart was enlarging, and so he was 
given water pills, which improved his condition. 
The Applicant applied for Social Security benefits, and was denied 
initially, but was then granted benefits upon filing an appeal. 
In his early twenties Mr. Olsen broke his right leg in a snowmobile 
accident. In 1970 he lost part of his right index finger in an industrial 
accident he sustained in upper Michigan. He has previously been compensated 
for that injury. The Applicant denied any prior heart problems or chest 
pains. In July of 1986 the Applicant had a gallbladder problem, which 
eventually resulted in gallbladder surgery. 
On cross-examination, the Applicant testified that his father died at 
age fifty-six of a heart attack and that he had also previously had a heart 
attack in his forties. His father also had diabetes, and Mr. Olsen has two 
brothers that also have diabetes. The Applicant's mother has high blood 
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pressure, as does the Applicant, Mr* Olsen started smoking at age sixteen, 
and would smoke one pack per day. He discontinued smoking in 1982, and he put 
on some weight as a result. Just before his heart attack of October 29, 1984, 
he had resumed smoking again. Following his heart attack of October 29, 1984, 
he discontinued smoking at the instruction of his doctors, and in July of 1985 
he started smoking again, but on a limited basis. The Applicant's records 
indicate that he has high cholesterol levels, but Mr. Olsen could not recall 
being told this by his doctors. He was told that he had coronary disease 
after his heart attack of October 29, 1984. The Applicant testified that the 
pain in his chest while climbing the conveyor belt was completely different 
and in a different location than the pain he had on October 29, 1984. 
Dr. Heuser released the Applicant to return to work on March 1, 1986. The 
Applicant applied for unemployment compensation on Movesober 25, 1985, and 
received some benefits, but was terminated when he moved to the Phoenix area. 
At present, the Applicant tires easily. He can mow his lawn, but it 
takes quite a bit longer. He also complains of occasional chest pain. 
With the file in this posture, the Medical Panel will need to 
determine if the heart attack of October 29, 1984, is a result of or related 
to the work activities of October 29, 1984. The Panel will also need to 
determine if the heart attack of December 2, 1985, is causally related to the 
heart attack of October 29, 1984. The Panel will also need to ascertain the 
permanent impairment due to the injury of October 29, 1984, and due to 
preexisting heart impairment. Finally, the Panel will need to indicate if the 
injury of October 29, 1984, aggravated the preexisting heart condition and, if 
so, whether that aggravation was permanent or temporary. 
^r Timothy C^CLlen 
^ Administrative Law Judge 
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November 19, I9d7 ; 
Timothy Allen 
Administrative Law Judge 
The Industrial Cccrmission of Utah 
1160 Est 300 South, P.O. Box 45580 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84145-0580 
Re: Douglas R. Olsen 
Dear Mr. Allen: 
This letter will sunmarize for you the results of my evaluation of 
Mr. Douglas R. Olsen. 
This 47-year-old male has risk factors for vascular disease
 f including a 25 
pack year history of cigarettes which he stopped in November of 1985
 f a history 
of elevated blood cholesterol, and a significant family history for coronary 
disease. His father had an infarct at age 52 and later died of cancer. His 
sister had percutaneous angioplasty of coronary artery obstruction at age 55. 
The patient's cardiac history began on October 29, 1984, when he was 
hospitalized in Roosevelt, Utah with an acute anterior wall myocardial 
infarction in progress. He was treated with streptokinase intravenously and 
two days later was transferred to Salt Lake City. He was found here to have a 
severe occlusion of the proximal left anterior descending artery and an 
angioplasty vas done of that vessel. Presumably the infarct that had occurred 
vas transmural prior to the angioplasty, howaver. 
The patient subsequently returned to work in January of 1985. He did well 
until December 2f 1985. Prior to December 2, 1985f he had been working on a 
dam construction project near Roosevelt, Utah. His job required him to do 
rather strenuous physical work repeatedly each day. He did wall during that 
workf howaver. At the last of November, the job site was closed down and he 
returned to his home near Durangof Colorado. On December 2f 1987, two days 
after returning hone he was again hospitalized with chest pain and this time 
found to have an acute inferior wall myocardial infarction. His early post 
myocardial infarction course vas complicated by overt left heart failure. 
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About one week following his admission to the hospital, he developed more chest 
pain. He was then transferred to Albuquerquef New Mexico where coronary 
angiography was performed. That study showed him to have significant three 
vessel coronary artery disease. He had total occlusion of the right coronary 
artery over much of its middle third and a recurrence of 90 percent severe 
occlusion of the proximal left anterior descending artery. An intra-aortic 
balloon was placed for hemodynamic support and an angioplasty was done of his 
proximal left anterior descending artery lesion. His section fraction was 
very markedly decreased and described as being 24 percent on that occasion. 
Subsequently, the patient has been stable. He is on nultiple medications, but 
has not developed any overt cardiac failure and is experiencing no recurrent 
chest pain. 
He does have a chronic severe exertional breathlessness and such minor activity 
as climbing a single flight of stairs renders him significantly breathless. He 
does denie, however, any palpitations, edema, orthopnea. He also has no 
breathlessness at rest. 
I failed to mention that his second myocardial infarction was preceded by a 
several week history of exertional burning pain in the substernal areaf which 
probably in retrospect represented angina pectoris, although the patient 
attributed it to "heartburn." 
His current medications include Dipyridamole 75 mg b.i.d., Cardiazem 30 mg 
b.i.d.
 f aspirin 325 mg b.i.d., Lasix 40 mg daily, Tagamet 300 mg as needed for 
abdominal pain. He takes zero to one per day. Questran one scoop before 
meals, and Niacin 500 mg twice daily. 
On physical examination he is a mildly overweight, middle-aged male. His 
weight is 210 lbs., his height is 71 inches, his blood pressure is 120/70, his 
pulse is 64 and regular. His neck veins are not distended. His cardiac exam 
reveals a prominent apical inpulse, evidencing left ventricular enlargement. I 
do not hear any nunnurs or gallops, however. His extremities are free of 
edema. His abdominal exam is negative and his pulses are normal without 
carotid bruits. 
In sunmary, then we have an early middle-aged male who is unfortunate enough to 
have had two separate myocardial infarctions. He obviously has premature 
atherosclerosis and we would attribute this to his major risk factors including 
the cigarette smoking, the elevated blood cholesterol, and particularly the 
positive family history for coronary artery diseaes. 
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Re: Douglas R. Olren 
I will answer the questions opposed in your letter of November 16
 f 1987. 
The first question has to do with whether or not the heart attack of 
October 29, 1984, was a result of or related to the work activities which he 
was engaged in at the tine. The myocardial infarction is known to be due to 
progressive atherosclerotic blockage of a coronary artery. The final event in 
a myocardial infarction is a clot which develops at the site of the severe 
atherosclerotic obstruction. This clot usually occurs while the patient is at 
rest and not usually during exertion. It would be very difficulty to explain 
how his various work activities might have had a causative role in producing 
the myocardial infarction. Our best understanding is that it was sinply due to 
the combination of predisposing factors which he had at the time. We would not 
attribute any causative role to any physical work which he was doing at the 
time. 
The second question relates to whether or not the heart attack of 
December 2, 1985, was causally related to the heart attack of October 29, 1984. 
If I understand the question correctly, the answer is no, the myocardial 
infarction of December 2, 1985, was not produced by the myocardial of 
October 29, 1984. However, both nr/ocardial infarctions have a camion 
causative element, that is the premature atherosclerosis which this patient is 
unfortunate enough to have. 
The third question relates to the degree of impairment from the myocardial 
infarction of October 29, 1984. Obviously, the myocardial infarction which he 
sustained on that date, did produce significant damage to his heart. He was, 
of course, able to return to work with a somewhat coipromised heart and seemed 
to function fairly well. His very extensive inccnpacity at present, is due to 
the combination of the two separate myocardial infarctions, which in 
combination have produced very extensive dysfunction of his heart. 
The next question is "what is the pre-existing heart impairment?" I am not 
sure what is intended by this question. If you are asking what was the heart 
inpairment prior to his first myocardial infarction in October of 1984, then 
the answer is that he had no significant inpairment of the heart muscle. He 
did obviously have early, extensive, and progressive coronary atherosclerosis. 
The function of the iruscle pump, however, was presumeably normal prior to his 
first heart attack. 
The final question asks whether or not the injury of October 29, 1984, 
aggravated the pre-existing heart condition, if so, was the aggravation 
perranent or tenporary. 
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Be: Douglas H. O]son 
I think this question has already been answered , if you will study all of the 
above material and try to understand the concepts contained therein. The 
answer to this question would be that he had no signif icant impairment of the 
heart muscle prior to October of 1984
 f and the first injury he had occurred on 
October 19, 1984. Obviously, this infarct produced a permanent scar or amount 
of damaged muscle to his heart* That amount of nuscle by itself was not enough 
to incapacitate him. It was only when the second myocardial infarction 
occurred in December of 1985
 f that he had sufficient muscle damage so that he 
is now penranently and significantly incapacitated. 
This letter will constitute my final report to you. If there are any further 
questions, please feel free to write or call. 
J. Preece, M.D. 
MJP:cm 
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ROBERT J. SHAUiHNESSY. PC. 
Attorney tor Appl icant 
1800 South West Temple. = -IO" 
salt Lake City. I'tali 8-41 IS 
Telephone: (801 ) -*66o028 
THE INDUSTPIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 86000411 
DOUGLAS R. OLSEN, 
Employee-Applicant, 
vs. 
TYGER CONSTRUCTION CO., 
Employer-Defendant, 
WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Insurance Carrier-
Defendant, 
AND 
SECOND INJURY FUND, 
MOTION 
FOR 
REVIEW 
Applicant herein files this Motion for Review on the 
grounds that the Administrative Law Judge incorrectly applied 
accepted medical principles of causation in heart cases and 
incorrectly applied the rules announced in Allen v. Indust-
rial Commission. 
The above Motion for Review will be supported by the 
following Memorandum. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REVIEW 
1. Dismissal of Objections to Medical Panel Report. 
The Medical Panel Report adoption by the Administrative 
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Law Judge becomes the first medical opinion expressed in 
workers compensation law in this state that flatly denies 
exertion/ stress or strain as being a causative factor in 
myocardial infarction cases. 
From the time of its adoption in 1952, the medical 
standards in heart cases the issue has always been the amount 
of stress, strain or exertion. Litigation in all cases - in 
Utah and nationally - is always directed at the amount of 
strain to produce the infarct even in the presence of severe 
arteriosclerosis. 
Dr. Michael J. Preece in dealing with the critical 
question of "... whether or not the heart attack of October 
29, 1984 was a result of or related to the work activities 
which he was engaged in at the time" responded by stating 
"... it would be very difficult to explain how his various 
work activities might have had a causative role in producing 
the myocardial infarction. Our best understanding is that it 
was simply due to a combination of pre-disposing factors 
which he had at the time. We would not attribute any 
causative role to any physical work which he was doing at the 
time. 
It is interesting to note that the doctor - just prior 
to the above statement - makes this observation: "This clot 
ususally occurs while the patient is at rest and not usually 
during exertion." The medical history of exertion induced 
coronary occlusions with or without myocardial infarctions 
proceed on the theory that the exertion breaks loose the 
2 
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clot. 
The Medical Panel failed to read the entire file as is 
required or failed to read or understand the summary of 
testimony supplied by the administrative law judge. The 
judge not only explained the circumstances of the accident of 
October 1984 but also the doctor failed to realize the impart 
of the statement that "... The Applicant was paid temporary 
total disability compensation for the period October 30, 1984 
through December 2, 1984." (Emphasis Added) 
The doctor failed to observe or understand the original 
response of Defendant Wausau Insurance wherein the claims 
representative reports as follows: 
"Our company provides the workers compensation 
insurance for Tyger Construction. On October 24, 
1984, while working at Tyger Construction, you 
developed chest pain that was subsequently 
diagnosed as an acute arteroseptal myocardial 
infarction. 
Our company provided medical coverage and time 
loss benefits for this prcbr.e-.iu" (Emphasis Added) 
The same letter goes on to state: 
"We have gathered the medical information 
relating to your treatment following the onset of 
your problems on December 2, 1985 and we have 
determined that this problem has been diagnosed as 
an inferior wall myocardial infarction. 
Your records have been examined by an 
3 
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independent cardiologist, and based upon his 
assessment he feels there is no relationship 
between the problem you developed on October 29, 
1984 and your most recent incident of December 2, 
1985,* (Underscoring added). 
The Medical Panel completely ignored the report of Dr. 
Ace Madsen, (Exhibit E) who not only diagnosed the Applicant 
as having the myocardial infarction and placed its occurrence 
on the job on 10/29/84. This will be discussed at length in 
part III. 
In the Memorandum of Authority submitted by Defendants 
counsel the industrial nature of the incident of October 1984 
was neither disputed nor denied. 
In his Answer filed after the original denial by his 
client Wausau, Defendant admits "... that the Applicant was 
off work following his first heart attack from October 29, 
1984, to December 4, 1984 by deny liability for the same/ 
Let it be known that everyone including Wausau, defendants 
counsel, applicant, applicants counsel, and the adminis-
trative law judge all agree that liability was assumed and 
benefits paid. 
In the pre-hearing memorandum defendants counsel by way 
of background writes as follows: 
"On or about October 29, 1984 during the 
course and scope of his employment, the Applicant 
began experiencing chest pains and he was sub-
sequently diagnosed as having suffered an acute 
4 
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letter of 3/12/86 was more specific in reporting as follows: 
"... The patient had an anterior infarction 
11/84 treated with streptokinase an coronary 
angioplasty. I saw him after an inferior descend-
ing coronary artery that was dilated in Salt Lake 
City. He had severe diminished left ventricular 
function with restenosis of that vessel and 
underwent coronary angioplasty of the left anterior 
descending coronary artery, the vessel that was 
occluded previously in Salt Lake City. All of 
these medical problems have certainly related to 
the first problem from 1984." 
The opinion of Dr. Davidson, the treating physician, was 
not before Dr. Preece but it was certainly before the 
administrative law judge. However, all of the above 
information was before him and the doctor never referred to 
such records and obviously did not read either the admissions 
by the Defendant, all of the medical records of treating and 
consulting physicians, all of whom agree that "exertion" 
played a part in the industrial accident of October 1984 and 
that a myocardial infarction occurred. 
All of the foregoing is substantial in conflict with the 
opinion of the administrative law judge "... that the 
overwhelming preponderence of the medical evidence on this 
file supports the findings of the Medical Panel. 
With reference to the industrial accident of October 29, 
1984 the opinion of the Medical Panel becomes the only 
6 
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(1985) and the activities engaged in by Applicant. This was 
truly the only issue of the case. 
The Applicant's medical evidence from Dr. Ace Madsen, 
Drs. Heuser and Davidson all support the MI on 10/29/84 and 
the opinion of Dr. Preece alone was contrary. 
I would refer the Commission to the administrative law 
judge's analysis in the recent case of Mabbutt vs. Price 
River Coal - Case No, 82001604. Counsel participated in the 
early defence of this case so I have some familiarity with 
it. 
The Commission is well aware of the circumstances of 
this case as well as the Supreme Court opinion. The central 
issue of the case turns on exertion and medical causation in 
a miner found dead at the mine face. 
In his Order Upon Remand the following appears from 
Judge Allen. 
"The Act does not require that the death of an 
individual be the result of a necessary precip-
itating factor, rather the Workers Compensation Act 
would appear to only require that the work activity 
were a sufficient precipitating factor resulting in 
the death of the employee." 
The Judge then proceeds to review the opinions of the 
various medical experts beginning with the employer's doctor 
and continuing to the panel doctor and applicant's doctor. 
"... He (Dr. Fowles, employers doctor) also 
went on to indicate that he agreed with Dr. Perry 
8 
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myocardial infarctions. 
Granted that this is not viable evidence for the 
proposition that this Applicant would be entitled to the same 
result as Mabbutt. It was only submitted to demonstrate how 
far outside the mainstream of thought on causation Dr. Preece 
is. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission is not 
bound by blind acceptance of the Medical Panel report. The 
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that it is subject to 
contrary opinion and that such opinion may be the basis for 
its decision. 
In this case, Drs. Heuser and Davidson flatly agree that 
the heart attack of October 29, 1984 was precipitated by the 
unusual exertion of that day. Wausau Insurance by assuming 
liability also specifically agreed. Dr. Perry defendants 
expect (who was the Medical Panel chairman in Mabbutt) 
impliedly agreed by observing only that the heart attack of 
December 1985 was not causally related to the incident of 
October, 1984. 
In summary the only expert who takes a contrary position 
is Dr. Preece whose position is contrary to most if not all 
cardiologists. Such evidence is particularly unusual. 
When you consider that all cardiologists upon finding 
the presence of severe arteriosclerosis advise all patients 
to reduce substantially if not completely all physical and 
mental stress. It is impossible to understand how Dr. 
Preece could reach the conclusion that he did. 
10 
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Referring to the letter of Dr. Heuser (Exhibit "B") and 
the outlined portions dealing with the severity of his heart 
problems which pre-existed his October 1985 accident and the 
Medical Panel Report on the same subject indicate that the 
impairment resulting from the October 1984 was significant 
without expressing a percentage, it is only logical to assume 
that the arteriosclerosis was a pre-existing disease and it 
was this that produced the total disability. 
This of course means that we have an accident producing 
a significant impairment chargeable to the carrier the 
balance then becomes the province of the Second Injury Fund. 
Everyone seems to charge all of the problems to the pre-
existing condition particularly the Medical Panel. If the 
Commission carves out of this an amount representing that 
which is chargeable to the accident, the balance applies to 
the Second Injury Fund. 
No one quarrels with the fact that the Applicant is now 
totally disabled, is not supposed to engage in any kind of 
gainful activity which could prove fatal and now receives 
total disability Social Security. 
As indicated above the December 1984 incident becomes 
academic if liability is placed on the October 1984 accident. 
3. Application of the Allen disease. 
The Applicant testified and the administrative law judge 
found that on October 29, 1984 that while working on 
maintenance at the hour of 6:00 p.m. in below freezing 
temperatures, he was attempting to break loose a frozen 
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in the course of employment. Since the claimant had previous 
back problems, to meet the legal causation requirements he 
must show that the moving and lifting several piles of dairy 
products weighing thirty to fifty pounds in the confined area 
of the cooler exceeded the exertion that the average person 
typically undertakes in non-employment life." 
The administrative law judge has already found that "the 
activities of October 29, 1984 must have amounted to exertion 
beyond what the Applicant would have expended in ordinary 
life." If necessary the legal cause has been met. But is 
the bifurcated approach to the matter of accident necessary, 
if Applicant had no knowledge or appreciation of the serious 
problem in his heart. 
The Commission must remember that the first symptoms 
(pain) appeared within less than five minutes of the unusual 
exertion. Within twenty minutes the Applicant began to sweat 
and become clammy. The E.T. on the job thought the problem 
was flu. When symptoms persisted within an hour or so the 
Applicant was in the hospital. 
Dr. Ace Madsen of the clinic at Roosevelt filed his 
report of work injury and it should be spelled out rather 
clearly. 
Dr. Madsen gives the detail as follows: 
"8. Describe complaints. Crushing substernal 
chest pain that occurred while at work on 10/30/84. 
(Everyone agrees and the form shows last day of 
work 10/29/84.) 
Exhibit "G" p. 14 Addendum -4 0-
9 , Findinq<~ ' - " " n a t i o n Mil < 
1U I I II'I a g r e e " d4) *. i ie male 
c o m p l a i n i n g cf c e v . * i ~ , k> *: 3 i a g r . j s t u u£ a c u t e 
my or 11 rl I l 
1,1, . i ' j m s ; : : Acute a n t e r i o r v 7 . 
1 3 . Oate of LxiSL t r e a t m e n t : 10, '1 '84 2 :00 
1 4 . Type r t r e a t m e n t : Admi t ted t i ICH at 
DCH -and t r e a t e d wi th :;t r e n t nk i n i r I i i i i i i j -
g l y c e t ' i n e r an I decani*.1. * 
Even a p p l y i n g t h e A l l e n r u l e mini r i»qu i r, i nq hhe "unusua l 
e x e r t i o n " t e s i 111 i i 11 n i i 11 i i 11 | i i i i i i in i m | mi i j i i i m i -T
 r 
Doctor Ma i.ifn d i a g n o s e d the At-pli ,anl us hav ing a m y o c a r d i a l 
i n f a r c t i o n hav inq i t o o n s e t on the juL j a s L a few liuucs p t i o t 
t i I in i n i nil mi i in in 1 in 11 in in 
A l l d o c t o r s i n c l u d i n g I In Mi H e a l P a n e l d o c t o r f o u n d 
t h a t a m y o c a r d i a l i n f a r c t i o n o c r u r r p d \t H n h I i IIIM in 1 | I  in " 
A I I I il I in I i i I I 11 I l ).) I l i i I , 11 in p i i o c t o L i J 11 l> "I a n c o s , 
a i l t h e d o r t o r s i t i he h o s p i t a l IIIIIII > 1 n u q u e r q u e u n a n i m o u s ] / 
a g r e e d ^ i d t a n i n f a r c t I I « < i > 
i i in 111 j i i > i III. 
I f o n e w e r e t n s t r i r t l j f o l l o w A I I P F I , H I P i i n l q p h.i 
f o u n d t h a t t h e a c t i " i M i " i M I »i 1111 i 11 Il i i il I 11 I 11 11 11 I > 11 
f o u n J u n i t a m y o r a F i l i a l i i i C a i c t i o n o e u i c t e d , B o t h p r o n g s of 
t h e t e s t r .„t J t - i J e P n m e t • 
'
 ,
 ' ' \!-L!iLl "'" ' ' ' n ' I i e q u i r e 
f
 mi M L J c a n I" I D h a i p sui i ie k n o w l e d g e * o f h< i \ \ > \ \ t >; • 1 I t j < n ,» t h e 
1 5 
| , , x l l l b l t
 "" " P- 15 Addendum, -4 1-
standard is even clearer that what happened on October 29, 
1984 was a myocardial infarction occurring on the job and no 
evidence of exertion or causal relationship would be 
necessary. 
All doctors agree, including Dr. Preece, that the 
myocardial infarction is in fact an internal failure within 
the heart and if symptoms develop on the job, as it did here 
the result would make it compensable. 
I am certain this is the reason why Wausau assumed 
liability in the first instance. 
It is interesting to note that the opinion letter by Dr. 
J. Joseph Perry responds to Mr. Sagara by saying "I have 
reviewed the records of Douglas Ronald Olsen who has suffered 
an acute anterior wall myocardial infarction on or about 
October 28, 1984. Details of his activity and precipitating 
factors were not included in the materials sent to me." 
(Emphasis added). 
Dr. Perry agreed that an MI occurred. Hade he been 
supplied information on Applicants activity and pre-
disposing factors, I feel reasonably certain his opinion 
would have been the same as in Mabbutt. 
A footnote in the Allen case pretty much spells out the 
Supreme Court standards and how they are applied on page 4, 
note 3. An "internal failure" refers to a category of 
injuries that arise from general organ or structural failure 
brought about by an exetion in the work place. Internal 
failure claims evaluated by this court include heart attacks, 
16 
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hernias, and back injuries. See generally, note, Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission and Injury Compensability Under Utah 
Workers' Compensation Law: A Just Result or Just Another 
"Living Corpse"? 1984, Utah L. Rev. 393. 
All through the heart and back cases by the Supreme 
Court the cases waffle from ordinary activity producing an 
internal failure as being compensable in some and not in 
others. However, all through these cases there seems to be a 
solid committment that unusual or extraordinary exertion that 
results in an internal failure has been deemed to be 
compensable. 
The position of the Applicant therefore is that the 
activity of October 29, 1984 was in fact unusual and that 
such unusual or extraordinary activity resulted in a 
myocardial infarction (an internal failure) suffered by the 
Applicant. Either theory of Allen amply supports this. The 
only meaningful result of the Medical Panel Report was to 
find that the December 1985 occurrence was unrelated to the 
October 1984 industrial accident. 
To determine otherwise would defeat the purpose of 
Workers Compensation law. As stated by Judge Allen in 
Mabbutt, "the Act would appear to only require that the work 
activity were a sufficient precipitating factor resulting" in 
this case to a myocardial infarction suffered by the 
Applicant. 
j/t 
DATED this 4V ^ day of March, 1988 
Attor/iey/for Applicant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed this ?{ ?v V 
day of Marchf 1988 a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion for Review to the following, postage prepaid: 
Michael Dyer, Esq. 
P.O. Box 687 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84110 
Douglas Olsen 
P .O. Box 687 
Mancos , CO 81328 
Wausau I n s u r a n c e 
P .O . Box 7400 
Mur ray , UT 84107 
Second I n j u r y Fund 
P .O . Box 510250 
S a l t Lake C i t y , UT 84151-0250 
The or ig ina l of the foregoing was hand-delivered to^the Indus t r ia l Commission 
of Utah th i s 30th day of March, 1988. 
T t o b e r t ^ r ? Shauo j rhessy , 
Attorjatey f o r A p p l i c a n t 
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step in deciding whether any defendant is 
justified under section 76-2-405 is to deter-
mine what burden of proof the defendant 
and the State are respectively required to 
carry. It is impossible to allocate the bur-
den of proof without first determining 
whether the defendant is entitled to the 
statutory presumption. 
In view of the foregoing, we vacate the 
trial court's finding of delinquency and re-
mand this case for factual findings as to 
whether the entry into RJ2.'s home was 
unlawful and forcible, or otherwise quali-
fies under U.CJL, 1953, § 76-2-405(2) for a 
legal presumption of reasonableness, and a 
new determination regarding jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court based on such findings. 
HALL, CJ., STEWART, Associate 
CJ, and HOWE and ZIMMERMAN, 
JJ., concur. 
James LANCASTER, Plaintiff, 
v. 
GILBERT DEVELOPMENT, State 
Insurance Fund, and the Second 
Injury Fund, Defendants. 
No. 20897. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 20, 1987. 
Workers' compensation benefits for 
heart attack that occurred while claimant 
was at work were denied by the Industrial 
Commission, and claimant sought review. 
The Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that 
(1) heart attack was by "accident," but (2) 
conclusion that there was no medical causal 
connection between work conditions and 
the heart attack was neither arbitrary or 
of section 7S-3a-16). The findings we arc re-
quiring is this opinion are not jurisdictional 
findings, but rather findings relating to the ap» 
capricious nor without substantial evidence 
to support it 
Affirmed. 
Stewart Associate CJ., concurred in 
the result 
1. Workers9 Compensation «»571 
Heart attack was by "accident" for 
workers* compensation purposes where 
there was nothing in claimant's job duties 
to suggest he would suffer a heart attack, 
nor did he anticipate one, so that it was 
"unexpected." U.CJL1953, 85-1-45. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Workers' Compensation *>1536 
Conclusion of Industrial Commission 
that there was no medical causal connec-
tion between claimant's work conditions, 
during cold weather at high altitude, and 
his heart attack, was neither arbitrary or 
capricious nor without substantia] evidence 
to support it in light of conflicting medical 
evidence and facts that claimant was work-
ing in a heated backhoe cab, using hydrau-
lically operated controls. U.CJU953, 35-
1-45. 
Michael E. Dyer, Stephanie A. Mallory, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Dennis Lloyd, Susan B. Diana, Salt Lake 
City, for Stale Ins. Fund. 
Erie V. Boorman, Salt Lake City, for 
Second Injury Fund. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The claimant James Lancaster, seeks re-
view of the denial of workers' compensa-
tion benefits by the State Industrial Com-
mission for injuries from a heart attack 
that occurred while he was clearing snow 
with a backhoe at Brian Head Ski Resort 
We examine the evidence on this writ of 
review to determine if the claimant's heart 
attack is the result of an injury "by acri-
plication of an affirmative defense to criminal 
charges. 
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dent arising out of or in the course of his 
employment" U.CJL, 1953, § 35-1-45 
(Supp.1986). We recently established the 
analytical framework for internal injury 
cases such as this in Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Us-
ing the analysis in Allen, we affirm the 
decision of the Industrial Commission. 
On February 17,1984, the claimant, aged 
43, arrived for work at Brian Head Resort 
at his usual hour of 7.-00 a.m* The eleva-
tion at Brian Head Resort is approximately 
ten thousand feet Claimant's first task 
was to clear snow using a backhoe. Al-
though the temperature outside was cold, 
the cab of the backhoe was heated. All of 
the backhoe controls were hydraulically op-
erated and required no unusual effort to 
operate. During the morning's work, the 
claimant climbed in and out of the backhoe 
two or three times. 
The claimant experienced chest pains, 
which became more severe as the day pro* 
greased. These pains were more severe 
than similar pains he had experienced four 
days earlier. When the pains became debil-
itating, he informed his supervisor, who 
then called paramedics; the claimant was 
transported to a hospital in Cedar City, 
Utah. The treating physician determined 
that the claimant was suffering from acute 
anterior myocardial infarction. After one 
week at the hospital, the claimant was re-
leased to the care of his personal physician, 
Dr. Chanderraj. Although this was the 
claimant's first heart atuck, he had several 
preexisting risk factors that predisposed 
him to heart attacks: a twenty-year smok-
ing history, an elevated serum cholesterol 
level, an elevated uric acid level, and bor-
derline diabetes. 
On August 10,1984, the Industrial Com-
mission held a hearing in which one doctor, 
Dr. Perry, was appointed to a medical pan-
el. A bearing on the medical panel find-
ings was held on March 25,1985. On April 
5,1985, the administrative law judge issued 
his findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
order. The administrative law judge re-
viewed the conflicting medical evidence and 
then adopted the medical findings of the 
medical panel as his own. The administra-
tive law judge found: 
[T]he Applicant's work actyrities*and the 
myocardial infarction of [February 17, 
1984] do not constitute an injury by acci-
dent. The Applicant's heart attack was 
unexpected, but there was nothing about 
his work activities that could constitute 
an unanticipated, unintended occurrence 
different from what would normally be 
expected to occur in the usual course of 
events. His heart attack appears to have 
been a mere coincidence, end his work 
activities did not contribute significantly 
to its occurrence. At best, it is conjectu-
ral as to whether it even precipitated his 
heart attack, but it clearly was not a 
significant precipitating cause. There 
was no evidence that the Applicant's 
work activities on February 17, 1984 
were particularly different from the ac-
tivities he had been performing for many 
weeks prior thereto. 
The administrative law judge ultimately de-
nied the claim on the ground that the claim-
ant failed to show that the heart atuck 
was "by accident" and that the heart at-
tack was medically caused by an exertion 
in the workplace. 
Our scope of review of factual findings 
in Industrial Commission cases is limited. 
We have explained in prior cases: 
The reviewing court's inquiry is whether 
the Commission's findings are "arbitrary 
and capricious" or "wholly without 
cause" or contrary to the "one (inev-
itable] conclusion from the evidence" or 
without "any substantial evidence" to 
support them. Only then should the 
Commission's findings be displaced. 
Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Monfrtdi, 631 P.2d 
888, 890 (Utah 1981) {quoted in Pittsburgh 
Testing Laboratory v. Keller, 657 P.2d 
1367, 1370 (Utah 1983), and Sobo's Elec-
tronic Service v. Sabof 642 P.2d 722, 725 
(Utah 1982)). At the time of his decision, 
the administrative law judge did not have 
the benefit of our analytical framework for 
accident eases involving internal failures 
set forth in Allen v. Industrial Commis-
sion, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Neverthe-
less, the record is sufficiently developed for 
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us to apply Allen to the facts and conclu-
sions in the case before us. 
In Allen v. Industrial Commission, we 
explained that the Utah Workers' Compen-
sation Act, section 3S-1-45, requires proof 
that an injury occurred "by accident" and 
proof of a causal connection between the 
accident and the activities or exertions re-
quired in the workplace. 729 P.2d at 18. 
The administrative law judge's ruling 
shows that he found the evidence insuffi-
cient to meet both the accident and the 
causation elements. 
In Allen, we embraced the definition of 
"by accident" first formulated in Purity 
Biscuit Co. v. Industrial Commission, 115 
Utah 1, 201 P.2d 961 (1949). We rejected 
the position that an accident requires an 
unusual event or occurrence. 729 P.2d at 
20. An ordinary or usual exertion is suffi-
cient to meet the "by accident" definition if 
"the result of an exertion was different 
from what would normally be expected to 
occur, the occurrence was unplanned, un-
foreseen, unintended and therefore by acci-
dent." 729 P.2d at 22. The critical factor 
when determining whether an incident is 
bv accident is unexpectedness. 729 P.2d at 
22. 
[1] Despite a finding that the heart at-
tack was unexpected, the administrative 
law judge concluded there was no accident 
primarily because the claimant was under-
taking his usual work duties. That conclu-
sion cannot stand in light of the standard 
set forth in Allen. Although the claimant 
had experienced similar pains four days 
earlier, he had not been advised of the 
etiology of those pains and he had no fore-
warning that they would occur again on 
February 17. Moreover, there is nothing in 
the claimant's job duties to suggest that he 
would suffer a heart attack. There is over-
whelming evidence that the claimant did 
not intend to have a heart attack, nor did 
he anticipate one. These factors, taken 
together with the finding that the myocar-
dial infarction was the "unexpected" result 
of an exertion in the workplace, require the 
conclusion that the heart attack was "by 
accident." 
The next step requires us to analyze the 
causal connection between the heart attack 
and the working conditions. See Hone v. 
Shea, 728 P.2d 1008,1011 (Utah 1*86). We 
adopted Professor Larson's two-step causa-
tion analysis in Allen v. Industrial Com-
mission. 729 P.2d at 25. In order to meet 
the causation requirement, tnere must be 
sufficient evidence of legal cause and medi-
cal cause. Under the legal cause test, "a 
claimant with a preexisting condition must 
show that the employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk 
he already faced in everyday life because 
of his condition." 729 P.2d at 25. When a 
claimant has no preexisting risk factors, 
any exertion connected with the employ-
ment and causally connected with the inju-
ry as a matter of medical fact will satisfy 
the legal causatun test 729 PJ2d at 26. 
In addition to proving legal causation, 
the claimant must also prove medical cau-
sation. "Under the medical cause test, the 
claimant must show . . . that the iTi^ss, 
strain or exertion required by his or her 
occupation led to the resulting injury or 
disability." 729 ?2d at 27. 
In this case, the administrative law judge 
did not distinguish in his causation analysis 
between legal and medical causation. 
However, it is clear from the medical testi-
mony and other evidence presented to the 
administrative law judge that his decision 
was based on the failure to prove medical 
causation. Because the result in this case 
turns on the issue of medical causation, we 
will not examine the issue of legal causa-
tion. 
[2] The claimant argues that his work 
activities in cold weather and at a high 
altitude precipitated the myocardial infarc-
tion. The medical evidence before the ad-
ministrative law judge was less than con-
clusive. The claimant's physician, Dr. 
Chandenraj, was the doctor most certain 
that the working conditions at Brian Head 
contributed to the injury. His opinion, 
however, was not unequivocal. He stated 
that the altitude, cold, and working condi-
tions "probably" precipitated the heart at-
tack. Dr. Chanderraj answered questions 
by the claimant's counsel as follows: 
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Q. Let me ask you, Doctor, during all 
of the time that Mr. Lancaster has been 
your patient, have you had an opportuni-
ty to form an opinion as to whether or 
not the elevation, the cold, and the work-
ing conditions at the time of Mr. Lancas-
ter's myocardial infarction precipitated 
that heart attack? 
A. This is a very difficult question to 
answer because it's a gray area in the 
field of cardiology; the exact role of 
precipitating factors in producing the 
event, but it is well known that high 
altitude, where the oxygen content of the 
air is low, especially in cold weather, can 
induce a myocardial event 
Q. Would it be your opinion that the 
cold, exposure, and the altitude, and the 
work conditions played a significant role 
or would be the trigger or the lighting up 
process of the myocardial infarction? 
A. I think we did go over this. I do 
feel it triggered—let me put it another 
way. If he had not been working up on 
that particular day in the cold atmo-
sphere, operating the heavy equipment, 
in spite of having—in spite of five days 
history of chest pain, he probably would 
not have sustained a myocardial infarc-
tion. 
Dr. Perry, the chairman of the medical 
panel and a cardiologist, testified it was 
"likely" that the conditions under which 
Mr. I-ancaster was working aggravated his 
preexisting heart condition. However, Dr. 
Perry also was less than certain about the 
causal connection between the work condi-
tions and the myocardial infarction. In his 
report to the administrative law judpe, Dr. 
Perry identified and ranked the role of 
various risk factors, including those associ-
ated with work, in precipitating the claim-
ant's myocardial infarction. He stated in 
his report; 
Mr. Lancaster has mild diabetes mellitus, 
smokes cigarettes, has an elevated unc 
acid and an elevated serum cholesterol 
level, all of which increase risk of coro-
nary artery disease. In very rough 
terms the cigarette smoking, diabetes 
and high cholesterol approximately each 
double the risk of coronary artery dis-
ease sucn that with these three plus the 
uric acid elevation, his risk for coronary 
artery disease is 8-10 times higher than 
another male of his same age. From„ 
information gleaned from the recotds, 
summary of testimony and talking to Mr. 
Lancaster himself, I did not view his 
work as a risk factor for a myocardial 
infarction. While it was apparently cold, 
he was not involved in any unusual exer-
tion, neither was he subjected to any 
unusual stress. 
. . . While it is possible the cold expo-
sure and his exertion had a role in precip-
itating the myocardial infarction, it is my 
opinion that is is unlikely they played a 
significant role. His 5 days of unstable 
angina lead me to believe that the patient 
was about to have a myocardial infarc-
tion, and the rather moderate amount of 
exertion and the length of time spent 
working simply offered an appropriate 
time and place for this event. 
When asked to quantify the contribution 
of preexisting risk factors and work 
factors to the claimant's myocardial infarc-
tion, Dr. Perry assigned a value of 90 per-
cent to preexisting conditions and 10 per-
cent to work conditions. Dr. Perry ex-
plained, however, that his assessment of 
the factors was "a fairly random guess." 
In addition, the State Insurance Fund 
had its doctor, Frank Dituri, review the 
claimant's medical records. Dr. Dituri 
opined that there was no evidence to indi-
cate that the claimant's myocardial infarc-
tion was caused by his work or the altitude 
and cold at his place of work. Dr. Dituri 
concluded, 'The type of work activities de-
scribed could not precipitate any acute 
myocardial infarction." According to Dr. 
Dituri, the claimant's injury was "due to 
the normal progression of arteriosclerotic 
coronary artery disease that had been 
present for several years and was due to 
such factors as his smoking, his hypercho-
lesterolemia his poorly controlled diabetes 
and his prior history of alcohol abuse/' 
Thus, although there may have been 
some connection between the heart attack 
and the cold weather and high altitude, the 
evidence of any such connection is inconclu-
sive. Not one of the doctors was willing to 
state with medical certainty that the claim-
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ant's injury was caused by work-related statutory authority or rule which property 
factors. Thus, there is competent and com- conferred jurisdiction upon appellate court 
prehensive medical evidence in the record a& well as other information, will result in 
upon which the administrative law judge dismissal of appeal, particularly wbefe eoun-
could rely in concluding that medical causa-
 Bel ignores appellate court* request that 
don was lacking. Although the medical statement be properly amended. Rules 
evidence was conflicting, it is the responsh App.Proc., Rule 9(e). 
bility of the administrative law judge to 
resolve factual conflicts. *• Appeal and Error *»784 
We hold that the Industrial Commission's APP^ ^ u i r e d <kmissal where coun-
conclusion that there was no medical causal ** ffled docketing statement which failed 
connection between work conditions and to »»Ply **h requirement that statement 
the claimant's heart attack is neither "arbi- •«* ' o r t h **y statutory authority or rult 
trarv or capricious" nor "without any sub- w^ch properly conferred jurisdiction upon 
stanual evidence to support it" We there- appellate court Rules AppJProc, Rules 9, 
fore affirm the order of the Industrial 9(d). 
Commission. 
HALL, CJ.f and HOWE and 
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, Associate CJ.f concurs in 
the result 
Craig BROOKS, PlaintifT, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SE-
CURITY, Board of Review of the Indus* 
trial Commission of Utah, Defendants. 
No. •60284-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 24, 1987. 
After completion of litigation, counsel 
for plaintiff petitioned for writ of review. 
The Court of Appeals held that appeal re-
quired dismissal based upon counsel's filing 
of docketing statement which did not com-
ply with rule requiring statements to set 
forth statutory authority or rule which 
properly conferred jurisdiction upon appel-
late court 
Dismissed. 
1. Appeal and Error *»784 
Failure of docketing statements to ful-
ly comply with rule requiring citation of 
LaMar Duncan, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff. 
Linda Wheat Field, Attorney, Dept of 
Employment Sec, Salt Like City, for de-
fendants. 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and 
DAVIDSON, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION 
PER CURIAM: 
(1* 2] In the above case, plaintiffs coun-
sel filed with this Court a "docketing state-
ment" that does not comply with Rule 9 of 
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The statement filed fails to set forth any 
statutory authority or rule which properly 
confers jurisdiction upon this Court Other 
information required by Rule 9 is also lack-
ing and necessary documents are not at-
tached. R. Utah CtApp. 9(d). 
Docketing statements must fully comply 
with Rule 9. Failure to comply wfll result 
in dismissal of the appeal, particularly 
when counsel ignores our request that the 
statement be properly amended. Grtgory 
v. Fourthwtst Investments LUL, 735 P.2d 
33 (Utah 1987); R. Utah CtApp. 9(e). 
The appeal is dismissed. 
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